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"ONE NATION, UNDER GOD, INDIVISIBLE, WITH LIB-
ERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL1"'
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1. From the Pledge of Allegiance. This small part of the pledge of allegiance ironi-
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violated by one claiming a religious privilege. Is it possible to provide "Liberty and Justice
for All?"
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Introduction
The federal and state constitutions guarantee the right to free ex-
ercise of religion. Congress and a majority of state legislatures have
enacted statutes to protect citizens against discrimination when rent-
ing or purchasing housing. Both free exercise rights and housing dis-
crimination protections are highly valued in our society. In fact, it is
difficult to find interests that elicit such emotional responses as are
aroused when either is threatened. In the last six years, however,
cases have arisen that seemingly endanger both interests. In these
cases, religious freedom and housing discrimination protections are
asserted directly against each other, and the court faces an emotion-
ally-charged decision: one interest must win and another must lose.
One of the most paramount of American rights is freedom of reli-
gion. It is no accident that it is the first fundamental right listed in the
Bill of Rights. The colonists who ratified the United States Constitu-
tion without a Bill of Rights were anxious to amend it to include a
guarantee of religious freedom. 2 The early settlers had journeyed to
America to escape religious persecution in their European homelands
because of the lack of protection for religion.3 Though almost all col-
2. Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 1559, 1579 (1989).
3. Everson v. Board of Educ. of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947); Kath-
leen P. Kelly, Note, Abandoning the Compelling Interest Test in Free Exercise Cases: Em-
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onists were Christians,4 there were numerous sects of Christianity in
colonial America.5 Even after independence was achieved, one
church often dominated individual states, and citizens realized that
the new union's coherence depended on guaranteeing that the new
federal government would not favor one religion over another.6 As a
result, the Framers drafted the First Amendment, guaranteeing that
the federal government would not abridge the free exercise of reli-
gion, nor make any law regarding an establishment of religion.
Almost 200 years later another issue caused as much concern for
the preservation of a unified nation: civil rights. On April 10, 1968,
congressmen on the floor of the House of Representatives debated a
piece of civil rights legislation to quell the rising tide of anger and
racial tension bringing fear and hysteria to the nation.7 That week's
events had been horrifying: Dr. Martin Luther King was assassinated,
and rioting had followed his murder.8 The bill being debated was the
so-called "anti-riot legislation," but it contained a portion which pro-
hibited racial discrimination in housing.9 Feeling pressed to respond
to the urgency of the nation's condition, the House Rules Committee
allowed only one hour for debate and prohibited amendments. 10 The
legislation passed and later formed the foundation for the Fair Hous-
ployment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 929,
934 (1991).
4. United States v. Dow, 25 F. Cas. 901, 903 (C.C.D. Md. 1840) (No. 14,990).
5. Everson, 330 U.S. at 10; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 2, at 1567 n.29, 1629.
6. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 730-31 (Leonard W. Levy
ed., Macmillan Pub. Co. 1986).
7. 114 CONG. REc. 9554-9608 (1968).
8. Representative Cohelan summarized the week's events:
I must share with you the deep disappointment and regret I have felt over
the last 6 unhappy days.
I have just returned from the funeral of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr.... Suffice it to say that the sadness of the whole Nation bespeaks the massive
loss which we have suffered with the passing of this extraordinary man....
These last 6 days have brought an abject shame on this country.
First the coldblooded murder of Dr. King.
The shame and the tragedy could not have been greater, as an apostle of a
peaceful America, equally open to all its citizens, a man who believed his country
could and would meet its challenges and provide for its people, was violently
struck down.
That violence begot more violence.
In scores of cities, in the Nation's Capital, men have been killed, homes and
businesses destroyed, thousands of families have been disrupted. Helmeted and
armed troops patrol our major cities.
As the Palm Sunday weekend of murder, pillage, and destruction unfolded, I
could not help asking myself, "What will it take to awake this great country to the
anger, frustration, and despair that afflict it?"
Id- at 9577.
9. Id. at 9554.
10. Id. at 9576.
July/August 1996]
ing Act. The legislation served as a symbol of cooperation extended
from Congress to African-Americans in a time of national turmoil.1
Such were the beginnings of free exercise rights and housing dis-
crimination protections in federal law; nonetheless, federal codifica-
tion of these two interests lagged behind the legislation of many
states. Colonial constitutions guaranteed free exercise rights well
before the United States Constitution was amended to add them.12
Twenty-two states had already passed housing discrimination statutes
before Congress passed its version in 1968.13
Both freedoms-to believe and practice one's religion and to ob-
tain housing for which one is qualified without regard to race or other
protected characteristics-are of great worth in our society. Several
states, however, have seen cases in which a landlord could not comply
with marital status discrimination prohibitions because they conflicted
with his religious beliefs. Hypothetical scenarios involving conflicts
between various discrimination laws and free exercise follow:
1. Michelle and Michael have been dating for five years and have de-
cided to live together. Neither, however, desires to marry until
they are certain they are compatible. They both begin to look for
an apartment to share by visiting each of the three apartment com-
plexes in their small community. All three complexes are owned
by Peter, a deeply religious man who considers it a sin for couples
to live together outside of marriage. Peter says he feels he would
be "aiding and abetting" in their sin by renting to them and would
incur sin upon himself.
2. John and David have been shopping for an apartment to share and
have found one they would like to rent-a small studio built onto a
large home in the suburbs. After they complete the application,
the homeowner, a pious man who believes homosexuality is a sin,
asks them if they are homosexual. After John and David answer in
the affirmative, the homeowner abruptly tells them he has no va-
cancy for them.
3. Amanda, an African-American, is looking for an apartment in the
city to which she has just moved. A co-worker informs her of an
available flat that she can afford. When Amanda enters the man-
ager's office to inquire about the flat, he shouts racial epithets at
11. See text accompanying note 124.
12. ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTrrUTION:
I-S ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 98 (1948).
13. 114 CONG. REC. 9582 (1968). The represented states were: Alaska, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. Id. Twenty-one of those statutes
provided broader protection against racial discrimination in housing than the federal stat-
ute. Id.
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her and angrily tells her to get off his property. Unbeknownst to
Amanda, the manager is a member of a small cult which believes
that the Bible advocates separation of the races and that African-
Americans are evil.
In all three cases, a court must decide if constitutional guarantees
of free exercise of the landlord's religion are important enough to
overcome statutory prohibitions against discrimination in housing, or
if the governmental objective of eradicating discrimination justifies
curtailing a fundamental right.
Four states have dealt with the conflict between free exercise and
anti-discrimination statutes in their courts within the last six years. 14
Though housing discrimination statutes protect many characteristics,
all four states' supreme courts addressed marital status discrimination
allegations. The cases demonstrate the difficulty of the conflict be-
tween the two interests: there is no middle ground for a court to reach
in any one particular case. Only one interest can prevail, while the
other must fail.
This Note explores the nature of the conflict by viewing each in-
terest as it stands alone and then addressing the conflict created when
they are opposed to each other. Part One revisits the origin of the
Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution and its impor-
tant place in our society's system of values. Part One will also discuss
the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Oregon De-
partment of Human Resources v. Smith15 (hereinafter E.D. v. Smith),
which reduced the level of scrutiny courts need apply when determin-
ing if a statute's burden upon free exercise rights is legally accepta-
ble,16 as well as Congress' response to the decision, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.17 Finally, Part One compares state consti-
14. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n ex rel Bowles, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913
P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32
(1991), revieW granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed as improvidently granted,
859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993) (depublished from official reporter); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets,
636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990). All
cases involved facts similar to scenario one.
The federal system is just beginning to hear such cases-although only on the district
court Jevel. See, e.g., Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, 876 F. Supp. 1231 (D.
Utah 1995) (Brigham Young University as intervener) (alleging gender, marital status, and
religious discrimination in housing against landlords who contracted with the university to
provide off-campus housing and correspondingly complied with the university's moral code
for students).
15. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
16. Id. at 879. "[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obli-
gation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' ld.
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
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tutional free exercise provisions and contrasts those provisions to the
federal constitution.18 Part Two discusses housing discrimination stat-
utes. This Part addresses the federal Fair Housing Act,19 its origins
and development through amendment and case law, and similar state
statutes.20 Part Three untangles the results and reasoning of the four
state supreme courts who resolved the competing interests. This Part
identifies various elements of the courts' reasoning and compares the
discussions of the courts with respect to each element. For example,
this Part addresses each of the steps in the analysis to determine if a
free exercise exemption to a law is warranted. Part Three also dis-
cusses some courts' use of a hierarchy of discrimination approach,
which supports that race and gender discrimination prohibitions will
always prevail over free exercise in a conflicts case. The hierarchy
approach illustrates why the difficult cases are those which present
marital status discrimination-a lesser category than race or gender
discrimination-in conflict with free exercise rights.
Part Three of this Note concludes with practical suggestions for
courts and legislatures when faced with the challenge of untangling
this conflict. So far, state supreme courts have opted to enforce one
interest at the expense of the other. Regardless of the interest chosen,
however, these bright-line rules often yield unreasonable results. For
example, a state that emphasizes free exercise rights in all circum-
stances gives license to a landlord to discriminate in leasing, even if he
owns all the apartments in a city. On the other hand, an anti-discrimi-
nation state would forbid a homeowner from preferring to rent to a
married, versus unmarried, couple. Part Three proposes a rule that
can be applied reasonably in most situations. This rule distinguishes
between large and small landlords and removes the necessity for
states to choose one interest over the other for all situations.
18. The parameters of this Note do not allow for an analysis of the free exercise
clauses of every state constitution. Only the constitutions of the four states whose courts
have decided cases of conflict between state housing discrimination statutes and state free
exercise clauses are addressed. The four states are Alaska, California, Massachusetts and
Minnesota.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601-03, 3604 (1994).
20. Again, the scope of this Note does not allow for an analysis of such statutes for
every state. Hence the only statutes addressed specifically are those from states whose
courts have addressed the religion/discrimination conflict-Alaska, California, Massachu-
setts and Minnesota. See supra note 18.
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I. "ONE NATION, UNDER GOD .. .": Protecting
Religious Freedoms
A. The United States Constitution-The First Amendment Religion
Clauses
An overview of the historical background of the right to free ex-
ercise helps delineate the weight that free exercise should be accorded
in our complex scheme of rights.21
Among the many challenges to the ratification of the newly writ-
ten United States Constitution was the recurring objection that the
document lacked an enumeration of specific rights22 Among those
rights that the colonists desired to put beyond the reach of the new
federal government was the right to believe and worship as they
wished.23 Thus, during the process of ratification of the Constitution,
the colonists made clear to the founders that they wanted a Bill of
Rights drafted in the First Congress.24 While colonial constitutions
already guaranteed religious liberty, the colonists wanted to prevent
overreaching by the new federal government.25
In the First Congress, James Madison presented his first draft of a
religion clause which read: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged
on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national reli-
gion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed. ' '26 After some alteration
in the House and then in the Senate, a conference committee was or-
ganized.27 With Madison as chair, the committee drafted language
which, upon acceptance, was listed first in the Bill of Rights.28 The
First Amendment reads in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
21. A more thorough examination of the history of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment can be found in many sources including the following: Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of the religion
clauses); Adams & Emmerich, supra note 2, at 1579-82 (addressing the legislative history
of the religious clauses); BROADUS MITCHELL & LOUISE PEARSON MITCHELL, A BIOGRA-
PHY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 197-201 (2d ed. 1975) (discussing
Madison's introduction of the bill of rights and the ensuing debate in Congress).
22. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONsTITUTION, supra note 6, at 1538-39;
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 2, at 1579.
23. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRUsr. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REviEw
94 (1980).
24. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 6, at 730.
25. Id.; KELLY & HARBISON, supra note 12, at 98.
26. 1 ANNALS OF CONGR. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
27. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTER-
PRETATION 963-64 (Johnny H. Killian ed., 1987).
28. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 2, at 1579-82. The committee members were:
Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut), Charles Carroll (Maryland), William Paterson (New
Jersey), Roger Sherman (Connecticut), John Vining (Delaware) and James Madison
(Virginia).
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law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof .... 29
History does not reveal much about the intended interpretation
of the religion clauses. There is no record of Madison's committee
meetings,30 and the debates over the clauses are not "particularly illu-
minating. '31 Nevertheless, the present courts' and legal commenta-
tors' views of the founders' intentions influence the relative degree of
importance the religion clauses are given in today's First Amendment
jurisprudence. For example, John Hart Ely stated: "[F]or the framers
religion was an important substantive value they wanted to put signifi-
cantly beyond the reach of at least the federal legislature. '32 Without
abandoning historical perspective, present commentators are of the
impression that the two religious clauses33 are to be read together to
further the goal of religious liberty.34 The fact that commentators
continue to advocate religious freedom amidst an ever-increasing
number of cases challenging its pedestal position in the scheme of con-
stitutional rights demonstrates the strength of this goal.35
In the federal system, however, religious interests seem to have
lost ground over the past several years. Particularly, the Supreme
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment was subsequently ratified on De-
cember 15, 1791. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 2, at 1581.
30. Adams & Emmerich, supra note 2 at 1581.
31. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 95 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. ELY, supra note 23, at 94.
33. The two clauses are the Establishment Clause ("Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion") and Free Exercise Clause ("or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof"). U.S. CONsT. amend I.
34. See Adams & Emmerich, supra note 2, at 1598; Jesse H. Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PiTr. L. REv. 673, 677
(1980). See also Adams & Emmerich, supra note 2, at 1599-1602 (discussing the idea of
liberty of conscience as the focal philosophy of early American political thinkers, including
Madison, Jefferson, Williams, and Penn).
35. The commentators' thoughts are especially noteworthy amidst the numerous cases
and law review articles that address conflicts between the two clauses themselves. An ex-
ample of a conflict in this area of law is illustrated by the following: a defendant is charged
with a crime to which he defends by arguing the prescribed, or proscribed, conduct offends
his religious mores, and that therefore, he cannot conform. The argument follows that if
the government were to excuse the defendant's conduct, or if the court were to void the
law as interfering with the defendant's free exercise rights, the government would effec-
tively be violating the Establishment Clause by favoring defendant's religious position.
Courts, presumably to avoid this conflict, separate the clauses and decide cases according
to one clause or the other and develop jurisprudence of each separately. Michael W. Mc-
Connell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 6. Yet commentators argue
that the clauses should be read with one original end in mind-religious liberty. See Ad-
ams & Emmerich, supra note 2, at 1598; Arlin M. Adams & Sarah B. Gordon, The Doc-
trine of Accommodation in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 37 DEPAUL L. REV.
317, 337 (1988). In order to avoid this complex area, this article focuses only on conflicts
between the Free Exercise Clause and housing discrimination laws.
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Court's decision in E.D. v. Smith36 lowered the level of justification
needed to infringe upon one's free exercise rights.37 However, several
states have opted not to follow E.D. v. Smith, but to continue to sup-
port free exercise over competing interests. For example, at least two
of the four states that have dealt with a conflicts case (and which are
discussed in this Note) have decided not to use the E.D. v. Smith stan-
dard, but to continue to use the higher strict scrutiny standard in de-
ciding cases of conflict with free exercise rights.
38
Religious freedom has never been without its challenges, histori-
cally and presently.39 In the 1879 case of Reynolds v. United States,
the Court affirmed the constitutionality of a law criminalizing polyg-
amy, notwithstanding the defendant's argument that the Free Exercise
Clause authorized the practice directly connected with his religious
dictates.40 In another case, the Court clarified Reynolds by noting that
the antipolygamy law was a general marital law, not directed towards
restricting religious practice.4' In Minersville School District v. Gobi-
tis, Jehovah's Witnesses challenged the expulsion from school of chil-
dren who refused to salute the flag for religious reasons.42 The
Supreme Court rejected the free exercise argument.4 3 Sixty-one years
after Reynolds, the Court decided that mandatory vaccinations were
constitutional, notwithstanding that some religious beliefs forbade the
inoculation procedure.44 Thus, in these cases, free exercise rights gave
way to the interests of the regulation of marriage and the protection
of the health of a community.
In the same year that Minersville was decided, the Court held that
the First Amendment religion clauses applied to the states through the
36. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Despite the rule adopted in E.D. v. Smith, the Supreme
Court has not disavowed past acknowledgement of the fundamental nature of religious
freedom in constitutional jurisprudence. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14
(1974) (stating that free exercise of religion is a fundamental right). In School District of
Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963), for example, the
Court stated, "[t]he place of religion in our society is an exalted one."
37. E.D. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-90.
38. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235-36 (Mass. 1994); State by
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8-9 (Minn. 1990).
39. Regarding conflicts cases, there is no conflict issue for a court to decide if: 1) it is
established that the law was enacted to harm a particular religion or 2) the party seeking an
exemption from a law for religious reasons can not show that complying with the law bur-
dens the practice of the religion. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 21.1.
40. 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1986).
41. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940).
42. Id. at 591-92.
43. Id. at 593-95. In 1943, Minersville was overruled in West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), on free speech grounds rather than free exer-
cise grounds.
44. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 9 (1905).
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due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Con-
necticut.45 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments guaranteed the right to proselytize in public.
Three years later, the Court decided a number of important cases in
First Amendment jurisprudence, including West Virginia Board of Ed-
ucation v. Barnette which overruled Minersville.46 Along the same
lines as Cantwell, the Court upheld the right to distribute religious
pamphlets in public47 and to ring doorbells to distribute such litera-
ture.48 The Supreme Court further expanded rights under the Free
Exercise Clause that year in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, which held that
a tax on soliciting orders could not be applied to Jehovah's Witnesses
who solicited literature door-to-door. 49 Thus, in the above cases de-
cided in 1943, the Court expanded religious rights.
The next year, however, the Supreme Court reviewed a convic-
tion of a Jehovah's Witness for child labor violations.50 The defendant
violated a child labor law when a minor accompanied her as she sold
religious literature in the streets.51 Balancing the defendant's reli-
gious interest with the state's interest in protecting minors, the Court
found the state's interest more significant and affirmed the defend-
ant's conviction.
52
In 1961, Orthodox Jews presented a conflict created by state law
to the Court.53 They desired an exemption from a law requiring the
closure of businesses on Sunday pursuant to the state's goal of provid-
ing a uniform day of rest.54 Because Orthodox Jews observe the Sab-
bath on Saturday, they could either observe the Sabbath in
accordance with their religion and suffer a competitive disadvantage
by being closed two days of the week, or conform with the rest of the
community while working contrary to their religion. 55 The Orthodox
Jews argued that the latter, less economically restrictive, alternative
burdened their free exercise rights, and therefore, they were entitled
to an exemption. 56 The Court disagreed, noting that the state could,
but did not have to, grant an exemption.57
45. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
46. See supra note 41.
47. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
48. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-7 (1943).
49. 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943).
50. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 161-63 (1944).
51. Id. at 159-60.
52. Id. at 170-71.
53. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); see also, Gallagher v. Crown Kosher
Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
54. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 602-03.
55. Id. at 601-02.
56. Id. at 608-09.
57. Id.
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In 1963, however, the Court ruled on behalf of the Free Exercise
Clause in a case involving the denial of unemployment benefits.5 8 In
Sherbert v. Verner (hereinafter Sherbert), a Seventh-Day Adventist
was discharged from a position that required working on the Sabbath
and was denied unemployment benefits as a result.5 9 The Court held
that such a denial impermissibly burdened free exercise rights.60 In
Wisconsin v. Yoder (hereinafter Yoder), the Court protected Amish
parents from a law requiring parents to send their children to school.61
In both cases, the Court applied the strict scrutiny standard, which
requires that the competing interest be compelling-of the highest or-
der-and that the statute be narrowly tailored for free exercise restric-
tions to be justified.62 Congress restored the strict scrutiny standard in
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 63 for use in federal courts af-
ter the Supreme Court disregarded it in E.D. v. Smith.64 Under these
pre-E.D. v. Smith cases, free exercise is a fundamental right which can
only be infringed upon in limited circumstances by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Both Sherbert and Yoder provide the standard
used by many states in deciding cases of religious rights infringement.
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Di-
vision65 'also presented the Court with a free exercise argument for
exemption from a law that arguably burdened religious practice. Indi-
ana denied Thomas unemployment benefits because, for religious rea-
sons, he refused a job at a plant which manufactured weapons. 66 The
Court held such denial of benefits impermissibly burdened free exer-
cise rights.67 The next year, however, the Court decided that the gov-
ernmental interest in exacting mandatory tax contributions from
employers was a compelling interest and justified infringement of
Amish employers' free exercise rights inasmuch as such contributions
were contrary to Amish beliefs.68
In 1983, Bob Jones University v. United States called on the Court
to balance the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimina-
tion against protection of free exercise rights.69 A federal law pro-
vided that the tax-exempt status would be refused to schools that
58. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
59. Id. at 399-401.
60. Id. at 406.
61. 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972).
62. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
64. 494 U.S. 872, 878-79, 885 (1990).
65. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
66. Id. at 709.
67. Id. at 719-20.
68. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982).
69. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (decided with
Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc. v. United States).
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discriminated on the basis of race.70 Bob Jones University claimed
that denial of tax exemption because of its religiously-motivated prac-
tice of race discrimination burdened its free exercise rights, and thus it
was entitled to a free exercise exemption.71 The Court disagreed,
finding the government's interest in eliminating race discrimination
compelling and outweighed any burden on free exercise rights im-
posed by denial of a tax benefit.
72
As the chronology reveals, in the decisions of Sherbert and Yoder,
in 1963 and 1972 respectively, and until 1990, the Court dealt with
conflicts cases by weighing the opposing interests and by utilizing the
strict scrutiny-compelling governmental interest standard. Unless the
Court found that the statute burdening rdligious rights was narrowly
tailored to further a compelling governmental interest, the party
whose free exercise rights had been impaired prevailed, and relief was
granted accordingly. In 1990, however, the Supreme Court decided
E.D. v. Smith.73 The controversial opinion,74 written by Justice Scalia,
declared that Sherbert and Yoder no longer represented the standard
of review to be used in free exercise conflicts cases.75 Justice Scalia,
seemingly abruptly, rewrote the standard in the six-three decision.
E.D. v. Smith involved two members of the Native American
Church who ingested the drug peyote at a church ceremony and were
discharged from their jobs because of this drug use.76 Later, the state
denied their applications for unemployment compensation because
their discharges were explained as resulting from work-related mis-
conduct.77 This case addressed the question of whether Oregon's pro-
hibition of peyote, even for religious use, violated the Free Exercise
Clause.78 The Court acknowledged that a state prohibition against a
religious belief or religious practice, specifically directed to that reli-
gion, would clearly be unconstitutional. 79 E.D. v. Smith, however, did
not involve such a law.8 0 The peyote prohibition had only the "inci-
70. Id. at 578-79, 595.
71. Id. at 602-03.
72. Id. at 602-04.
73. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
74. See Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 40 n.9
(1991) (depublished from official reporter); Ann E. Beeson, Comment, Dances with Jus-
tice: Peyotism in the Courts, 41 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1124 (1992); Richard John Neuhaus, A
New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 620, 630-31 (1992); Steven D.
Smith, Free Exercise Doctrine and the Discourse of Disrespect, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 519,
520 (1994).
75. E.D. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85.
76. Id. at 874.
77. Id. at 874.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 877-78.
80. E.D. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
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dental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provi-
sion."81 Thus, a neutral, generally applicable criminal law did not
violate the free exercise rights even though it barred certain religious
rituals.8 2 As such, the burden on free exercise did not render the pro-
vision unconstitutional.8 3
Justice Scalia distinguished cases applying the Sherbert strict scru-
tiny standard to evaluate interests competing with religious rights by
noting that post-Sherbert decisions "held that the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pros-
cribes)."'' 84 Thus, he extrapolates a general rule from the holdings of
prior conflicts cases while failing to emphasize that the Sherbert stan-
dard was applied to achieve the end results of those cases. Justice
Scalia carries the argument further when he notes that although Sher-
bert had been used to analyze free exercise conflicts cases, it had never
been used to invalidate criminal prohibitions. 85 In delivering a final
fatal blow to Sherbert, Justice Scalia states: "To make an individual's
obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence
with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compel-
ling' . . . contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense.... [and] would produce here - a private right to ignore gener-
ally applicable laws .... ,86
Justice Scalia, however, created an exception to his own "gener-
ally applicable law" rule. In situations where at least one other consti-
tutional right is threatened, in addition to the free exercise right, the
strict scrutiny standard would be applied.87 This so-called "hybrid"
situation reinvigorates a Sherbert-like analysis and requires a compel-
ling governmental interest to justify burdening a plurality of constitu-
tional rights.88
The E.D. v. Smith decision was not popular with Congress and
inspired a three-year congressional campaign to overturn it. Congress
interpreted the decision as a blow to free exercise rights by making it
81. Id. at 878.
82. Id. at 890.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,263, n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
85. E.D. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85.
86. Id. at 885-86. Ironically, Justice Scalia addressed a religious audience of late, en-
couraging them to "pray for the courage to endure the scorn of the sophisticated world."
John Biskupic, Justice Preaches to Christians-Ignore 'Scorn,' S.F. CHRON., Apr. 10, 1996,
at A3. In one reporter's account, Scalia "offered a scathing portrayal of a society that is
not merely skeptical but that disparages religious belief and believers . . . ." Id.
87. E.D. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
88. Id. at 881-82.
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easier to burden religious rights, if not to ignore them altogether.89
As a result, in 1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act,90 (hereinafter "RFRA") which explicitly restored the Sher-
bert and Yoder standard-the compelling governmental interest
standard-in free exercise jurisprudence. 91
The House debates reveal the enormous popularity of RFRA.92
In fact, the record is replete with support for the act in both houses of
Congress93 and in the Clinton administration. 94 The debates, one-
sided in support of RFRA as they were, make clear that the intent of
Congress was to remedy what was viewed as the Supreme Court's er-
ror in E.D. v. Smith.95 The opinion was blamed as the cause of a
number of decisions inimical to Congress' idea of free exercise rights
and to "victims"' religious beliefs: autopsies were performed on
Hmong and Jewish deceased persons;96 Amish buggies were required
to be outfitted with lights;97 evangelical store-front churches were
zoned out of commercial areas;98 a Catholic hospital lost its accredita-
tion because it would not perform abortions;99 and a homeowner was
denied the right to erect a cross on her property.100 Congress recog-
nized that religious interests will not always prevail; government inter-
ests will sometimes be compelling enough to justify subordinating free
exercise rights-as with any constitutional and fundamental right. 0 1
Before minimizing the right to freedom of religion in favor of a com-
peting interest, Congress intended to be clear that the superseding in-
89. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox
Into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L.
REv. 357, 360-61, 381 (1994).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (1994) provides: "The purposes of this chapter are-(1) to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert ... and Wisconsin v.
Yoder ... and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened .. " Congress also does not hide the fact that it enacted RFRA
expressly in response to E.D. v. Smith: "The Congress finds that ... (4) in Employment
Division v. Smith .. .the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion;
and (5) the compelling interest test ... is a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(a) (1994).
92. 139 CONG. REc. H2356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993).
93. Id.; 139 CONG. REC. S14,461-71 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).
94. See 139 CONG. Rac. at H2358-59 (daily ed. May 11, 1993) (letter from the Attor-
ney General).
95. Id. at H2356.
96. Id. at H2357.
97. Id.
98. Id. at H2360.
99. 139 CONG. REc. at H2361.
100. Id. at H2362.
101. Id. at H2360-61.
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terest must occupy a more fundamental societal position pursuant to
Sherbert and Yoder.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet reviewed
RFRA, 02 nor has it decided any cases using its restored standard of
review.'0 3 Some circuit courts and district courts, however, have be-
gun to apply its standard. 1' 4 If RFRA survives constitutional scrutiny,
federal courts-and state courts which follow the federal analysis-
already have established precedent regarding the restored standard of
Sherbert and Yoder. Thus, only cases decided under the lower E.D. v.
Smith standard between 1990 and 1993 will need to be disregarded.
B. State Constitutions-The Religion Clauses
The First Amendment's religion clauses serve state citizens by
guaranteeing a minimal level of protection against government intru-
sion into the practice of religion. The states, however, can and often
have drafted their own constitutions to offer broader protections.
Even in some states where the phraseology of religion clauses in con-
stitutions appears much the same as that in the First Amendment,
state courts have interpreted their state constitutions as offering more
protection than does the Federal Constitution.
The scope of this Note does not allow for an analysis of the reli-
gion clauses in each of the 50 states. Four states have been selected
for illustration: the constitutions of the states of Alaska, California,
Minnesota, and Massachusetts' 05 each include a section granting free
exercise protections.
Alaska's Freedom of Religion Clause is almost identical to that of
the Federal Constitution.10 6 The Alaska Supreme Court has inter-
102. One federal circuit court has upheld the constitutionality of RFRA. Flores v. City
of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1364 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g en ban4 denied, 83 F.3d 421, and
petition for cert. filed, (June 25, 1996). Other courts have done likewise. See Sasnett v.
Department of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305, 1320-21 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (United States as
intervenor); Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510, 512-17 (D. Haw. 1995).
103. However, Justice Thomas dissented from the Court's denial of certiorari in Swan-
ner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994). In his dissent, he reviews
the purpose of RFRA and infers an opinion of constitutionality. Id. at 460-62.
104. See American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 654-56 (4th Cir. 1995);
Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24160, at 6-9 (9th Cir. Sept. 2,
1994); Davidson v. Davis, No. 92 Civ. 4040, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1696, at *13-16
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1995); Robinson v. Klotz, No. 94-1993, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 717, at
*21-22 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 1995); Woods v. Commissioner Parker Evatt, 876 F. Supp. 756,
761-62 (D.S.C. 1995); Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of the
Dist. of Columbia, 862 F. Supp. 538,544-47 (D.D.C. 1994); Riely v. Reno, 860 F. Supp. 693,
709 (D. Ariz. 1994).
105. Each of these states has addressed the issue of conflict between free exercise
rights and anti-discrimination in housing laws.
106. ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 4. It reads: "No law shall be made respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id.
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preted the clause to give no broader protection than is provided in the
First Amendment. 107 In fact, until the California Supreme Court's de-
cision in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission'08 (here-
inafter Smith v. FEHC), Alaska was the only state of the four which
did not offer broader free exercise protections than are guaranteed
under the U.S. Constitution.
Prior to the California Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
FEHC, the California Courts of Appeal had assumed their state's con-
stitution guaranteed broader free exercise protections.109 Unlike
Alaska, the religion clause in the California Constitution is worded
quite differently from the First Amendment. It reads: "Free exercise
and enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are
guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does not excuse acts that are
licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The
Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion .... -110 In Smith v. FEHC, the state supreme court, in its plural-
ity opinion, does not reject altogether the view of the Courts of
Appeal, but instead uses cryptic language on the matter and avoids
finality on this issue. At one point, the court states that it has applied
a SherbertlYoder analysis."' The court later states that it had also
used E.D. v. Smith-like language in upholding generally-applicable
laws. 1' 2 So, the extent to which the California Constitution protects
free exercise in comparison to the U.S. Constitution is unclear.
In contrast, Minnesota went to great lengths in drafting and inter-
preting its constitution to provide greater religious freedom guaran-
tees for its citizens. The religion clauses of its constitution are quite
lengthy. 1 3 In interpreting the state's religious guarantees, Minne-
107. Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1236 n.3 (Alaska 1979); see generally Frank v.
State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Alaska 1979) (involving the prosecution for illegal transporta-
tion of game killed for religious funeral feast).
108. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
109. See Feminist Women's Health Ctr., Inc. v. Philobosian, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1076,
1085-86 (1984); Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. App 3d 1012, 1016
(1987).
110. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 4.
111. Smith v. FEHC, 913 P.2d at 930-31.
112. Id.
113. MINN. CONsT. art I, § 16 reads:
The enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair others
retained by and inherent in the people. The right of every man to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall
any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to
maintain any religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any
control of or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any pref-
erence be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of
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sota's Supreme Court stated that the state's "Freedom of Conscience
Clause" provides more protection than the federal First Amendment
and requires that the high "compelling state interest" standard apply
to cases where other interests burden free exercise interests.
114
Finally, Massachusetts, like Minnesota, seems to have gone to
great lengths to draft an expansive constitutional guarantee of reli-
gious rights. Massachusetts' religion clauses can be found in two arti-
cles. Article of Amendment XVIII, section 1 reads: "No law shall be
passed prohibiting the free exercise of religion. 11 5 Yet Article II goes
farther in asserting not only a right, but a duty to worship.
116
Although the state's highest court has not made explicitly clear the
intention to offer greater religious freedoms than the Federal Consti-
tution, it has applied the higher Yoder and Sherbert standards, rather
than the E.D. v. Smith standard, in deciding cases of conflict with free
exercise rights."17 This seems to indicate Massachusetts' intent to pre-
serve state religious freedoms as occupying a fundamental position in
the state's scheme of rights. Moreover, it seems reasonable to infer
from the state's history that these religious protections are at least as
expansive as those under the First Amendment. Massachusetts is an
original colony and its constitution contained religious guarantees
before the U.S. Constitution was even ratified.
1' 8
In sum, RFRA requires that cases of conflict with religious inter-
est receive the highest-Sherbert-level of scrutiny. Without strict
scrutiny, religious freedoms do not enjoy the same degree of protec-
tion granted other constitutionally-based fundamental interests such
as freedom of speech. In effect, the United States Supreme Court es-
the state, nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any
religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.
Id
114. Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 865
(Minn. 1992); see also State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990) (opining
that the language of the Minnesota Freedom of Conscience Clause is stronger than the
language of the federal First Amendment religion clauses).
115. MASS. CONSr. amend, art. XVIII, §1.
116. MAsS. CONST. Pt. I, art. II. Titled "Right and Duty of Worship; freedom of reli-
gion," the article reads:
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and at stated
seasons to worship the SUPREME BEING, the great Creator and Preserver of
the universe. And no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person,
liberty, or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable
to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession or sentiments;
provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious
worship.
117. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 1994).
118. For a history of the Massachusetts Constitution, see Society of Jesus of New Eng-
land v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Mass. 1990).
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tablished, in E.D. v. Smith, a hierarchy of constitutional values and
relegated free exercise rights to a lower tier. Religious freedom inter-
ests do not merit strict scrutiny and therefore receive less protection
than other constitutional rights when compromised alone. Under
E.D. v. Smith, the compelling governmental interest standard, and
corresponding status as a fundamental right, are only reinstated when
another constitutional right is threatened by the same opposing law or
regulaion-E.D. v. Smith's "hybrid" situation.
E.D. v. Smith is difficult to rationalize when considering the im-
portance the founders, and more importantly the colonists they repre-
sented in the First Congress, placed on religious freedoms. Justice
O'Connor commented in Bowen v. Roy:119
Even if the Founding Fathers did not live in a society with the [pro-
grams] that the Federal Government administers today .... they
constructed a society in which the Constitution placed express limits
upon governmental actions limiting the freedoms of that society's
members. The rise of the welfare state was not the fall of the Free
Exercise Clause.
120
Figuratively speaking, in E.D. v. Smith, Justice Scalia removed the
religion clauses from their premier placement in the list of the Bill of
Rights and placed them below all others. Congress, recognizing the
anomaly, passed RFRA to remedy E.D. v. Smith and to restore reli-
gious freedom as a fundamental right. Until RFRA's constitutionality
is affirmed, it is unclear how long this restored status will last.
In each state court system, however, courts have always been free
to use strict scrutiny despite federal system trends. In fact, one major
question states must ask in deciding conflicts cases is whether to limit
free exercise guarantees to those protected under the First Amend-
ment, as defined by contemporary federal free exercise jurisprudence,
or to expand them. Applying strict scrutiny on behalf of religious in-
terests will often serve to tip the scales in favor of religious interests.
11. "ONE NATION ... INDIVISIBLE": Eradicating
Discrimination in Housing
A. The Federal Approach
The federal statutes prohibiting discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing are collectively known as the Fair Housing Act 121
(hereinafter "FHA"). Although the FHA began as just one of eight
titles within the Civil Rights Act of 1968, it is now viewed as one of
the nation's most important laws in preserving civil rights.
119. 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. Id. at 732.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1994).
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In 1968, the nation was in turmoil. The assassination of Dr. Mar-.
tin Luther King, Jr., a champion of the civil rights movement, resulted
in widespread fear and hysteria as rioting escalated throughout the
country.'22 Troops in full battle gear guarded the Capitol Building in
Washington D.C.123 Inside, congressmen in the House of Representa-
tives debated the then so-called "anti-riot" legislation of which the
"open housing" provision, now the foundation of the FHA, was a
part. Some representatives admitted their support for the legislation
was aimed at regaining peacefulness by quelling the anger of the riot-
ers.1 24 Others strongly opposed such sentiment, arguing the legisla-
tion would trigger only more lawlessness. 25 The difference between
supporters of and opponents to the legislation, in general, seems to be
in regard to the goal sought to be achieved. Opponents viewed pacify-
ing rioters by the passing of legislation as Congress opening itself up
to more and more demands from the lawless, whereas supporters felt
such measures were overdue and rioters deserved to have demands
met.12
6
As adjudged from transcripts of House and Senate debates, the
housing section was not the most prominent provision in the anti-riot
legislation. In fact, Title VIII of the act-the open housing provi-
sion-was never discussed in Senate Report No. 721, set forth as part
of the legislative history. 27 The report does, however, state the pur-
pose of the legislation: "To meet the problem of violent interference,
for racial or other discriminatory reasons, with a person's free exercise
of civil rights. The areas of protected activity are specifically de-
122. Debra L. Alligood, Comment, When the Medium Becomes the Message: A Propo-
sal for Principal Media Liability for the Publication of Racially Exclusionary Real Estate
Advertisements, 40 UCLA L. REv. 199, 209 n.36 (1992).
123. 114 CONG. REc. 9583 (1968).
124. ld. at 9554-9583.
125. Id. at 9574. As Rep. Fisher stated:
It has been said that this legislation will ease racial tensions, that it will vindicate
the cause served by the late Martin Luther King .... This is the sort of legislation
which will aggravate and promote discord, even as prior civil rights legislation
enacted by the Congress has triggered more and more racial violence, arson, van-
dalism, and riots.
Id.
The sentiment of a supporter is represented by Rep. Cohelan:
These [rioters] are people who have listened to the promises of better jobs, better
housing, better schools. Their frustration, their alienation from the mainstream,
is at the root of their behavior. Our job is to bridge the abyss to bring the reality
to the promise.
Id. at 9577.
126. See generally 114 CONG. REc. at 9554-83 (portion of the debate).
127. S. Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837.
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scribed."'1 28 That list of specified activities is quite lengthy, but receiv-
ing equal treatment in housing is not included.
129
On the floor of the House, discussion of the open housing section
focused on limited topics. First, both supporters and opponents were
concerned that the Rules Committee, by allowing only one hour of
debate and prohibiting amendments, forced representatives' hands on
a difficult issue.130 Opponents pointed to the current national turmoil
and urged colleagues not to be persuaded to pacify rioters with-
out further discussion.1 31 Supporters argued that legislation on
the matter, including the open housing issue, was past due.
132
Second, supporters reminded the House that 22 states, represent-
ing roughly 60 percent of the United States' population, already
had their own open housing laws.1 33 Finally, some were concern-
ed with the property rights of landowners and felt the open housing
provision would reap more dissension because it would force land-
owners to do with their property as they did not desire to do.
134
128. Id. at 1838.
129. The list specifically reads:
They include voting and activities related to voting; enrolling in or attending pub-
lic schools or public colleges; participating in or enjoying the benefits of services,
programs, facilities, or activities of Federal, State, or local governments; enjoying
employment, union membership, or the services of employment agencies; serving
on juries; using vehicles, terminals, or facilities of common carriers; participating
in programs or activities receiving Federal assistance, and enjoying the facilities of
hotels, restaurants, and other public accommodations.
Id. at 1838-39.
130. 114 CONG. REC. 9576 (1968).
131. Id. at 9556-57, 9576.
132. Id. at 9577.
133. Id. at 9554, 9565.
134. Id. at 9574. Rep. Cohelan's comments illustrate both the rebuttal to the property
rights argument and the belief that such legislation was past due to address the needs of the
oppressed minority:
Open housing is, of course, the most pervasive and controversial part of the
measure. Simply passing an open housing law will not bring an end of the
ghetto-but it will mean that those who have the means and the desire to leave
the ghetto will not be deprived of the chance to do so because of their race, reli-
gion, or national ancestry. And it will mean that minority citizens will no longer
legally have their dignity affronted by the denial of housing for discriminatory
reasons.
Federal open housing is not as some have called it, "forced housing." No one
is forced to rent or sell to any one. The law simply forbids the color or religion of
the prospective buyer or renter from being a factor in the sale or rental.
Real property rights have never been absolute. From the old English com-
mon law to the modern zoning ordinances, sale and use of land has always been
regulated to meet social goals. Similarly 22 States and 96 localities have enacted
open housing laws in the effort to attain the social goal of equal access to housing.
114 CONG. REc. at 9577.
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Comments on the Senate floor paralleled those in the House of
Representatives.135
Title VIII did not protect as many categories as the current FHA
does. In 1968, Title VIII protected only race, color, religion, and na-
tional origin. Congress expanded this list of protected categories in
housing discrimination in 1974 by adding "sex."' 136 As in 1968, discus-
sion on the amendment was insignificant in comparison to the amount
of debate on the larger provisions in the same bill.137 In fact, in the
Senate, the amendment prohibiting sex discrimination received only a
small, yet favorable, comment. 13
8
The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 added still more pro-
tections against discrimination in housing.139 This time, however, the
FHA received the full focus of the debate, rather than being lost as
part of a larger bill and inadequately discussed. The purposes of the
act were to "provide an effective enforcement system to make [equal-
ity in housing] a reality[,] ... [and to] extend [the principal of] equal
housing opportunity to handicapped persons... [and] to families with
children."140
Though the debates concentrated on the new amendments, Rep-
resentatives in the House emphasized racial discrimination and the
fact that inequality in housing persisted despite twenty years of fed-
eral prohibition. The work of Dr. King was referred to several
times,'41 and statistics showing pervasive racial discrimination were
read into the Record.142 For example, House Report No. 100-711
reads: "Twenty years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, dis-
crimination and segregation in housing continue to be pervasive.' 43
135. Id. at 5986, 5988, 5991 (discussing property rights concerns and sense that the
legislation would prevent rioting though this debate occurred prior to Dr. King's assassina-
tion). See generally id. at 5986-92 (transcript of Senate debate and vote in its entirety).
136. The larger legislation's overall purpose is laid out in the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974. S. Rep. No. 693, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reported in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4273. The bill is an omnibus bill of 8 chapters covering a broad range of
Federal housing and urban development programs." Id. at 4273.
137. See generally 120 CONG. Rac. 6172-6216 (1974) (portion of debate).
138. 120 CONG. Rac. 6146 (1974).
139. H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 13 (1988), reported in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2174.
140. Id.
141. 134 CONG. Rac. H4610, H4604, H4605 (daily ed. June 22, 1988).
142. 1d. at H-4612, H4609.
143. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 123, at 15, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2176.
The passage continues:
The Department of Housing and Urban Development estiates [sic] that 2 million
instances of housing discrimination occur each year. In the most recent national
study of housing discrimination, HUD concluded that a black person who visits 4
agents can expect to encounter at least one instance of discrimination 72 percent
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Today, the declared policy of the United States is "to provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States. ' 144 Section 3604 of the Fair Housing Act 145 prohibits
discrimination in selling, renting or refusing to negotiate for sale or
rental a dwelling on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial sta-
tus, national origin or handicap.
146
B. The State Approach
When the federal government enacted the FHA in 1968, twenty-
two states already had their own open housing statutes.147 Today, al-
most all states have such anti-discrimination protections for their citi-
zens.148 In fact, only one state, Mississippi, appears to lack them.
1 49
of the time for rentals and 48 percent of the time for sales.... Recent regional
studies including using testers, confirm that discrimination continues....
Professor Douglas Massey of the University of Chicago recently examined
residential segregation in 60 metropolitan areas, and found that blacks continue
to experience very high levels of segregation.
Id. at 15-16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994). See also Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc. v.
Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1075 (D.N.J. 1976)
(discussing congressional intent in enacting FHA); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1046
(E.D. Mich. 1975) (discussing purpose of FHA).
145. Section 3604 provides in pertinent part:
[I]t shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges
of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in con-
nection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwell-
ing that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection,
sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), 3604(f)(1) (1994). Because it is difficult to imagine a situa-
tion where a landlord would discriminate against a prospective buyer or tenant because of
a handicap-and then defend on religious grounds-this section will not be considered in
Part III.
147. See supra note 13.
148. State fair housing statutes are: ALA. CODE § 24-8-4 (1992); ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.80.240 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1491.14 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
123-203 (Michie 1995); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-
502 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64c (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4601 (1993);
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Unlike state free exercise clauses, state housing discrimination
laws do not vary significantly. However, they were all adopted at dif-
ferent times and were amended to add new categories of protection at
different rates.'5 0
Alaska adopted its open housing law'51 in 1965152 to prohibit race
and religious discrimination and did not amend the law until 1972
when the legislature added "sex" to the list of protected classes.1 53
Three years later, the legislature added "marital status," "changes in
marital status," and "pregnancy."'154 Finally, in 1987, the legislature
prohibited discrimination on the basis of disability.1 55
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6503 (1989); FLA. STAT. ch. 760.23 (1994 & Supp. 1996); GA.
CODE ANN. § 8-3-202 (1989); HAW. REv. STAT. § 368-1 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909(7)
(1995); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch 775, act 5 section 3-102 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 22-9.5-5-1 (Burns 1994); IOWA CODE § 216.5 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. 44-1001 et seq.
(1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.360 (Baldwin 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:2606
(West 1996); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4582 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 22 (1994); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(6) (Law. Co-op. 1982); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2502 (West Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1995); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 213.040 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (1994 & Supp. 1996); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 20-318 (1991); NEV. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 118.100 (Michie 1993); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A:8 (1995); N.J. REv. STAT. § 10:5-12 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7
(Michie 1992); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 18-c (McKinney 1992); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291,296
(McKinney 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1452 (1994 &
Supp. 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 659.033 (1989); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 955 (1994); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 34-37-4 (1994 & Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-21-40 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-20 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-601 (1991); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 301.021 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-1 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 4503 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.1 (Michie 1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.222
(1990); W. VA. CODE § 5-11A-5 (1994); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 101.22 (Supp. 1995); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-9-102 (1995).
149. Mississippi does, however, prohibit discrimination in housing receiving public
funding. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-33-723 (1993).
150. As in Part I, an analysis of each state's open housing law is not feasible. Only the
statutes of Alaska, California, Massachusetts and Minnesota will be addressed.
151. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1994).
152. 1965 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 117, § 6.
153. 1972 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 42, § 8.
154. 1975 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 104, § 11.
155. 1987 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 69, § 11. Section 18.80.240 now reads in pertinent
part:
It is unlawful for the owner, lessee, manager, or other person having the right to
sell, lease, or rent real property
(1) to refuse to sell, lease, or rent the real property to a person because of
sex, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy, race, religion, physical or
mental disability, color, or national origin; however, nothing in this paragraph
prohibits the sale, lease, or rental of classes of real property commonly known as
housing for "singles" or "married couples" only ....
ALASKA STAT. §§ 8.80.240 to 18.80.240(1) (1994).
July/August 1996]
The California Legislature acted earlier than Alaska in adopting
then Health & Safety Code section 35720 in 1959.156 Although section
35720 prohibited race and religious discrimination, it applied only to
publicly assisted housing. 157 Four years later, the legislature amended
the provision to apply to "all housing rented or sold by business estab-
lishments under the Unruh Civil Rights Act,"'158 because the State
found that over 2.5 million of its citizens-non-whites and whites with
Spanish surnames-were suffering discrimination in obtaining hous-
ing.159 In 1975, the legislature added gender and marital status
protections.160
Minnesota adopted an open housing law by amendment in 1961,
which prohibited race discrimination. 161 The order of amendments
then parallels those of the prior two states: "sex" was added in
1969,162 "marital status" in 1973163 and "familial status" in 1980.164
Massachusetts, on the other hand, is the most progressive of the
four states. The Massachusetts legislature enacted the state's open
housing law eleven years before the federal government succeeded in
passing the FHA. In 1957, the legislature added subsection six to an
existing provision.165 Massachusetts, however, lagged behind Minne-
156. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1681, §1. See Department of Continuing Education of the Bar
of the University of California Extension, Selected 1959 Code Legislation 34 CAL. ST. B.J.
581, 700-01 (1959) (discussion of the proposed bill).
157. Department of Continuing Education, supra note 156, at 700.
158. Committee on Continuing Education of the Bar, Selected 1963 Legislation, 39
CAL. ST. B.J. 609, 721 (1963).
159. Id. at 719.
160. Senate Final History, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. at 418. Today, the statute reads, in perti-
nent part:
[U]nlawful practices.
It shall be unlawful:
(a) For the owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate against any
person because of the race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, or
ancestry of such person....
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955(a) (Supp. 1996).
161. 1961 Minn. Laws ch. 428, § 5.
162. 1969 Minn. Laws ch. 975.
163. 1973 Minn. Laws ch. 729, § 3.
164. 1980 Minn. Laws ch. 531. The statute, in pertinent part, now reads:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice:
(1) For an owner, lessee, sublessee, assignee, or managing agent of, or other
person having the right to sell, rent or lease any real property, or any agent of any
of these:
(a) to refuse to sell, rent, or lease or otherwise deny to or withhold from any
person or group of persons any real property because of race, color, creed, reli-
gion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance,
disability, or familial status ....
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 Subd. 2 to 363.03 Subd. 2(1)(a) (West Supp 1996).
165. 1957 Mass. Acts ch. 426, § 2.
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sota in adding gender protections. It did not include "sex,". "age," and
"ancestry" until 1971.166 The legislature again amended subsection six
in 1973 to 'add "marital status."'167
Though each state has an open housing law with the same "bare
bones" protections as enumerated above-race, religion, sex, and
marital status-they differ in including additional protections.
Alaska's law also prohibits discriminating on the basis of pregnancy or
changes in marital status.168 Minnesota adds "status with regard to
public assistance" and familial status.169 Massachusetts includes pro-
tection for veterans, the blind and those with guide dogs.170 California
has not expanded its law beyond those categories listed above.
None of the four states has listed sexual orientation, or sexual
preference in their open housing provisions. Nor has the federal gov-
ernment added such protection. However, it is possible for a homo-
sexual couple, refused housing because of their sexual preference, to
bring a housing discrimination case by alleging discrimination on the
basis of sex or marital status. The couple could argue that if one of
166. 1971 Mass. Acts ch. 661.
167. 1973 Mass. Laws ch. 187, §§ 1-3. The law now reads in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful practice:
6. For the owner, lessee, sublessee, licensed real estate broker, assignee or man-
aging agent of publicly assisted or multiple dwelling or contiguously located hous-
ing accommodations or other person having the right of ownership or possession
or right to rent or lease, or sell or negotiate for the sale of such accommodations,
or any agent or employee of such a person:--(a) to refuse to rent or lease or sell
or negotiate for sale or otherwise to deny to or withhold from any person or
group of persons such accommodations because of the race, religious creed, color,
national origin, sex, age, ancestry or marital status of such person or persons or
because such person is a veteran or a member of the armed forces, or because
such person is blind; (b) to discriminate against any person because of his race,
religious creed, color, national origin, sex, age, ancestry or marital status or be-
cause such a person is a veteran or a member of the armed forces or because such
person is blind in the terms, conditions or privileges of such accommodations or
the acquisitions thereof, or in the furnishings of facilities and services in connec-
tion therewith, or because such person possesses a trained dog guide as a conse-
quence of blindness; (c) to cause to be made any written or oral inquiry or record
concerning the race, religious creed, color, national origin, sex, age, ancestry or
marital status of the person seeking to rent or lease or buy any such accommoda-
tion, or concerning the fact that such person is a veteran or a member of the
armed forces or because such person is blind. The word "age" as used in this
subsection shall not apply to persons who are minors nor to residency in state-
aided or federally-aided housing developments for the elderly nor to residency in
self-contained retirement communities constructed expressly for use by the eld-
erly and which are at least twenty acres in size and have a minimum age require-
ment for residency of at least fifty years.
MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(6) (West 1982).
168. Alaska Stat. section 18.80.240(1) (1994).
169. MINN. STAT. ANN. section 363.03 subd. 2(1)(a) (West Supp 1996).
170. MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 1518, section 4(6) (West 1982).
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the pair were a member of the opposite sex and/or if the couple was
then married, the landowner would not object to their tenancy.
To summarize, each of the four states protects the basic four cate-
gories-race, religion, sex and marital status-and each state adopted
them by amendment in the same order, though at different times. The
same is true in the federal system of the FHA which added categories
in the same order and protects the same categories with the exception
of using "familial status" in the place of the states' "marital status."'
1 71
111. "WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL": Free
Exercise Versus Discrimination Statutes
Both the history of the First Amendment and the history of the
Fair Housing Act illustrate the importance Americans place upon
both the free exercise of religion and upon eradicating discrimination
in our society. But a difference of opinion arises when the two values
are opposed to each other, and it seems necessary to make a difficult
decision between the two. Though the conclusion of this Note sug-
gests such a choice is avoidable, courts faced with cases of conflict
have essentially balanced the two interests and decided which of the
two prevails, in accordance with history and case law.
A. The Cases
The facts of the following cases are similar. Typically, a landlord
refuses to rent to an unmarried cohabitating couple and, in doing so,
violates a state housing law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
marital status. The landlord then defends himself by arguing his reli-
gious convictions dictate against renting to such a couple because their
act of living together and likely sexual relations outside marriage, is
considered sinful. The landlord seeks a free exercise-based exemption
to the state law.
In his treatise, Lawrence Tribe summarized the necessary ele-
ments a claimant must show to obtain such an exemption. 72 This test
applies only in states which apply the strictest standard of scrutiny, the
compelling governmental interest test, to cases of infringement of free
exercise rights. The claimant must first prove a sincerely held reli-
gious belief and then second, must prove that the state law substan-
tially burdens his religious exercise. 73 Only after the claimant
satisfies those two elements does the burden shift to the government
to show that the law pursues an "unusually important governmental
171. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).




goal" and that an exemption to the landlord would "substantially hin-
der the fulfillment of the goal."1 74
Under strict scrutiny, it is more difficult for state governments to
justify laws burdening a landlord's sincerely held religious beliefs;
thus, the landlord is more likely to earn a reprieve from punishment
under the open housing statute. The landlord needs to make a mini-
mal showing and then the burden shifts to the state to justify the law
by showing a compelling interest.
The supreme courts of Alaska,175 California, 176 Massachusetts,
177
and Minnesota 178 have each decided a conflicts case in the last six
years. All of these cases dealt with marital status discrimination in
which landlords refused to rent to a couple because of their religious
mores. Thus far, in attempting to balance the interests of discriminat-
ing landlords against the interests of injured tenants, the courts have
evenly split over the question of whose rights prevail.
(1) Minnesota
Minnesota was the first to decide such a case in 1990. In State v.
French, the Minnesota court faced a conflict between its marital status
discrimination prohibition in its open housing law and the state's con-
stitutional protection of free exercise.179 An engaged couple wanted
to live together prior to their wedding and pursued renting French's
two bedroom house. 80 However, French, a member of the Evangeli-
cal Free Church, refused to rent to the couple because of his religious
belief that sexual relations outside marriage is a sin.181 Notwithstand-
ing his reservations about sexual relations, he also believed that his
renting to an unmarried cohabitating couple would be aiding the "ap-
pearance of evil," and thus, would be contrary to his religious be-
liefs.182 The Minnesota Supreme Court resolved the case with its
interpretation of the marital status discrimination statute, rather than
by an analysis of the more interesting conflicts issue. 83
174. Id.
175. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska), cert denied,
115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
176. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996). Prior to
Smith, the California Supreme Court granted, then dismissed as improvidently granted,
another case involving the same issue. Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing
Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (1992), review dismissed as
improvidently granted, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (1993) (depublished from official report).
177. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
178. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
179. Id.
180. Id at 3.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 3-4.
183. 460 N.W.2d at 11.
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The four to three majority initially assessed Minnesota's fair
housing statute, and specifically, the legislature's intent in adding
"marital status" protections to the law. 184 The Court found that the
Minnesota legislature intended to protect the status of an individual,
i.e. single, divorced, married, etc., but not the individual's relationship
with a cohabitant. 185 Thus, the statute's marital status protections did
not prohibit refusals to rent to unmarried cohabitating couples. 186
This statutory interpretation section was the only portion of the opin-
ion to garner a decisive majority.
Three justices from the majority187 turned to the religious exemp-
tion analysis and applied strict scrutiny. They accepted that the land-
lord's religious beliefs were sincerely held and were burdened by the
marital status discrimination. 88 The opinion dismissed the argument
that the commercial nature of the landlord's activities affected the
analysis with respect to whether the law burdened the defendant's
religious rights.189 The justices stated:
[The state argues] that [the landlord] gave up his constitutional
rights "by entering the public marketplace." . . . It is unreasonably
cynical to say that his choice is simple: that he need not rent at all.
Economic necessity may require him to seek rental income and this
may be as critical to him as the need for wage income .... On the
other hand, what burden is imposed on [the tenant] to enable her to
rent, but not live with her fiance on the premises? 190
Having found the first two requirements met, the three justices
balanced the free exercise rights infringed against the state's interest
in eliminating marital status discrimination. Going to great lengths to
emphasize the long history of religious freedom and deep historical
roots in the protection of religious rights in both Minnesota and Wis-
consin.' 91, the three justices acknowledged that the Minnesota Consti-
tution offers far more protection of religious freedom than the Federal
Constitution. 192 Therefore, strict scrutiny would be applied.193
The three justices then noted numerous contexts in which unmar-
ried couples living together do not receive the same treatment as do
married couples, 194 such as in the areas of employment and health
184. Id. at 5-6.
185. Id. at 6.
186. Id. at 7.
187. The fourth majority vote concurred only with respect to part one of the opinion-
the statutory interpretation section. Id. at 11.
188. 460 N.W.2d at 10.
189. Id. at 7-8.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 8-9.
192. Id. at 9.
193. 460 N.W.2d at 9.
194. Id. at 10.
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insurance benefits.195 Finding that the "state has failed to sustain its
burden in demonstrating a sufficiently compelling interest," the three
concluded that burdening the landlord's free exercise was not
justified.1
96
The dissent, joined by three justices, disagreed with the majority
on every major point. First, the dissent found that the marital status
discrimination prohibition protects unmarried cohabitating couples,197
They then responded to the majority application of the exemption
analysis. The dissent agreed that the landlord's beliefs were sincerely
held' 98 but did not concur as strongly with the finding of a burden. 99
Though they eventually found a burden on the landlord's beliefs such
that the initial two prerequisites to the exemption analysis were
met,200 they appeared to sympathize with the state's argument that the
commercial nature of the landlord's activities affects the burden anal-
ysis.201 According to the dissent, "[w]hen followers of a particular sect
enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they
accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are
not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on
others in that activity. '202 The dissent reasoned that any burden im-
posed on the landlord by the statute is lessened "because it occurred
only when [the landlord] voluntarily entered into the rental market-
place.., and thus subjecting himself to potentially burdensome regu-
lations such as the Act's prohibition of marital status
discrimination. 12 03 Finally, the dissent disagreed with the three jus-
tices from the majority, determining that the state has an overriding,
compelling interest in enforcing the marital status discrimination
prohibition. 204
The balancing of interests did not decide the conflicts case in
Minnesota. The landlord won the swing vote only on the statutory
interpretation issue. Minnesota is the only state, of the four states, to
determine that the marital status protection of its fair housing law
does not extend to unmarried couples. Minnesota, therefore, is the
first to effectively decide the conflicts issue conclusively, but without
turning to constitutional analysis and the balancing of the competing
interests. The statutory protections do not apply in this circumstance;
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. ld. at 12 (Popovich, J., dissenting).
198. 460 N.W.2d at 14 (Popovich, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 14-15 (Popovich, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id. (Popovich, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 14-15 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)).
203. 460 N.W.2d at 15 (Popovich, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 16 (Popovich, J., dissenting).
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thus, Minnesota has crafted a bright line rule making it clear that its
landlords, so long as the statute is unamended or reinterpreted by a
newly constituted court, may freely discriminate on this basis.
(2) Massachusetts
In Massachusetts, the conflicts issue came up through the appel-
late courts on appeal from a summary judgment ruling in favor of the
defendant landlords. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Attorney
General v. Desilets,2 05 determined that summary judgment was prema-
ture and remanded the case to the trial court to give the "[Common-
wealth] a chance to demonstrate its compelling interest in the
application of the [marital status discrimination] statute.
'20 6
In Desilets, the landlords were brothers who owned a four-unit
apartment building and who refused to rent to an unmarried couple
because of their Roman Catholic belief that to do so would be facili-
tating the commission of a sin.2 0 7 Before turning to the free exercise
exemption analysis, the court noted that the marital status prohibition
applied to protect unmarried individuals seeking to rent an apartment
for joint occupancy.208 The parties did not dispute that the landlords'
convictions were sincerely held and were burdened by the housing dis-
crimination law. The court stated: "conduct motivated by sincerely
held religious convictions will be recognized as the exercise of reli-
gion. '20 9 The court determined that there are many ways in which the
statute burdens the landlords' free exercise privileges by making reli-
gious exercise more difficult and costly. Specifically, the court ob-
served that the "statute affirmatively obliges [landlords] to enter into
a contract contrary to their religious beliefs and provides significant
sanctions for its violation. Moreover, both their nonconformity to the
law and any related publicity may stigmatize the [landlords] in the
eyes of many .... -2l0 The court further noted that the commercial
context in which the violation occurred did not affect the substantial
burden analysis; a burden could be imposed in a commercial or non-
commercial setting.211 Therefore, the court was unanimous as to the
first two elements of the analysis.
The court was also unanimous on the question of the applicable
standard of review-the strict scrutiny/compelling governmental inter-
est standard. Noting the similarity between its own state constitu-
tional Free Exercise Clause and that in the Federal Constitution, the
205. 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
206. Id. at 241.
207. Id. at 234-35.
208. Id. at 235.
209. Id. at 237.
210. 636 N.E.2d at 237-38 (footnote omitted).
211. Id. at 238.
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declined to apply E.D. v.
Smith212 and instead followed its own state constitutional precedent to
apply strict scrutiny.
At the next phase of the exemption analysis, the unanimity of the
court broke down with respect to the weighing of the competing inter-
ests. A four justice majority decided to leave the question of whether
the state has a compelling interest in eradicating marital status dis-
crimination in housing up to the trial court on remand. Nevertheless,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court hinted that it preferred the free ex-
ercise interest. First, the court separated marital status from other
protected categories and from preventing discrimination as a whole.
It then declared that marital status was not as significant a state con-
cern as discrimination based on other categories. Unlike the other
enumerated categories (sex, race, color, creed and national origin),
marital status is not guaranteed equality under the law in the Massa-
chusetts Declaration of Rights.213
The majority explained that it would not be making the determi-
nation that a compelling interest justified the infringement of free ex-
ercise in order to establish an easily applied bright line rule for all
circumstances.214 Rather, it considered the protection of free exercise
interests to be of such importance that the lower Massachusetts courts
would address all conflicts cases in which a religious defendant sought
a religious exemption on a case-by-case basis.215 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, however, instructed the lower court that, in
determining if the state has a compelling governmental interest in the
instant case, it is to look at the state's interest in eliminating marital
status discrimination in housing both in the state as a whole and in the
specific area in which the violation occurred.21 6 Thus, the concern is
with the residential rental business, not participation in formal reli-
gious activity. Finally, the following quote further indicates the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court's leaning toward protecting free exercise
interests:
Without supporting facts in the record or in legislative findings,
we are unwilling to conclude that simple enactment of the prohibition
against discrimination based on marital status establishes that the
State has such a substantial interest in eliminating that form of hous-
ing discrimination that, on a balancing test, the substantial burden on
the defendants' free exercise of religion must be disregarded.217
212. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
213. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 239-40.
214. Id. at 240.
215. 1&
216. Id. at 241.
217. Id. at 240.
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The concurring opinion suggested that, according to one justice,
obtaining an exemption should be even easier than the majority indi-
cated. Article two of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
provides:
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly, and
at stated seasons to worship the SUPREME BEING, the great Cre-
ator and Preserver of the universe. And no subject shall be hurt,
molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worship-
ping GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates
of his own conscience, or for his religious profession or sentiments;
provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in
their religious worship.21
8
Though the majority felt that the section provides no more protection
than article forty-six, section one of the state constitution, 219 the con-
currence opined that the article should be applied and analyzed
first.220 The concurrence suggested remand to the trial court for a de-
termination of whether the defendants' refusal to rent constituted a
disturbance of the public peace.221 If not, the court should grant an
exemption. If the refusal constituted a disturbance of the peace, the
court would balance the state's interest in public peace versus the arti-
cle two rights that were infringed.222
The dissent was even more favorable to the defendant landlords
because it found that summary judgment in favor of the landlords was
acceptable.223 The three dissenting justices determined that the state
could not sustain its burden of proving a compelling interest in "ensur-
ing the availability of rental housing for unmarried couples with a sex-
ual relationship ... 224
Therefore, in Massachusetts, the housing discrimination law ap-
plies to protect unmarried cohabitating couples, however, landlords
can obtain exemptions from the law based on their religious beliefs.
Massachusetts' trial courts will determine whether, in the particular
case, landlords' free exercise rights to practice their religion by living
and doing business in accordance with their religious mores outweighs
the state's interest in fulfilling the purpose for enacting marital status
discrimination laws.
218. 636 N.E.2d at 241 n. 12. (quoting MASS. CONST. pt.1, art. III).
219. Id. at 243.
220. Id. (Liacos, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 246 (Liacos, J., concurring).
222. Id. (Liacos, J., concurring).
223. 636 N.E.2d at 246 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).




:Until the California Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Fair
Employment & Housing Commission, -5 (hereinafter Smith v. FEHC)
California appeared to protect free exercise interests in spite of mari-
tal status discrimination prohibitions. In a depublished California
opinion, Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,2
2 6
(hereinafter Donahue) the landlords refused to rent a unit in their
five-unit apartment building to an unmarried cohabitating couple. As
members of the Roman Catholic Church, they believed that fornica-
tion, and facilitating fornication by aiding the couple in living to-
gether, were sins.2 7 Like the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
California Court of Appeal decided for the landlord.228 Though re-
fusal to rent on the basis of the prospective tenants' marital status
violated California's fair housing law, the landlord was entitled to an
exemption from the law because complying with it conflicted with his
religious belief and infringed upon his constitutional free exercise
rights .229
The Donahue court explained that California's constitutional free
exercise rights offered broader guarantees than the Federal Constitu-
tion; thus, it applied the compelling state interest standard230 despite
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in E.D. v. Smith.-3 1 The court then
determined that the state's interest in protecting such couples from
discrimination in housing was not compelling.232 Focusing on a "hier-
archy" of protected categories, the court found that marital status, as
opposed to race, did not deserve as much protection against discrimi-
nation.233 The court also reasoned that while cohabitation is becom-
ing more and more the norm, California has not promoted the
practice in adopting it as a matter of government policy.234
Another California Court of Appeal reached a conclusion similar
to that of the Donahue court in Smith v. FEHC.235 A landlord, who
rented units in two duplexes, refused housing to an unmarried couple.
As was her practice, she informed the tenants that she preferred to
225. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
226. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (1992), review dismissed as
improvidently granted, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (1993) (depublished from official reporter).
227. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33 n.1.
228. Id. at 46.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 40.
231. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
232. Donahue, 2 Cal Rptr. 2d at 46.
233. Id. at 44.
234. Id. at 45.
235. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, rev. granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994), aff'd in part., rev'd in
part, 12 Cal.4th 1143, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
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rent to married couples because of her religious belief as a member of
the Bidwell Presbyterian Church, that sexual relations outside of mar-
riage was a sin.2 36
The court applied both the E.D. v. Smith federal analysis237 and a
state constitutional analysis and reached the same conclusion under
each. Had the state law prohibiting marital status discrimination in
housing238 burdened only the landlord's free exercise rights, under
E.D. v. Smith, the compelling interest standard would not have ap-
plied and the court's decision would have favored the tenants. How-
ever, the California Court of Appeal held that the landlord's free
speech rights were also burdened by the law, 239 thus bringing the case
within E.D. v. Smith's "hybrid" situation,2 40 which required the state
to demonstrate that eliminating marital status discrimination was
compelling and therefore justified infringement of the landlord's free
exercise and free speech rights.
The court also addressed the conflict under a California constitu-
tional analysis. Determining that the state constitution grants broader
religious protections than does the federal constitution, the court
found that a compelling interest standard is always implicated when
free exercise rights are threatened in California-even if it is the only
right implicated by the conflicting law.241
The court then concluded that eradicating marital status discrimi-
nation in the housing area did not constitute a compelling governmen-
tal interest.242 In evaluating the several types of discrimination
prohibited by the same law, the court found that, though the language
of the statute and the legislative history did not indicate that different
grounds of discrimination were to be arranged in a particular order of
importance, the different grounds were not intended to be treated as
equal.24 3 Marital status discrimination does not command the same
high level of protection that race discrimination demands.24
Therefore, until 1996, strict scrutiny was warranted under a Cali-
fornia constitutional analysis and the state's interest in protecting
couples against marital status discrimination was not compelling
236. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397.
237. Id. at 399-400.
238. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West Supp. 1996).
239. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40. Smith had been ordered to post a notice in her rented
apartments stating that she had been found guilty of discrimination on the basis of marital
status. Id
240. Id.
241. Id. at 408-09.
242. Id. at 409-10. Only the specific category of marital status discrimination was the
focus of the inquiry-not the overall housing discrimination law. Id. at 404.




enough to overcome the burdening of free exercise rights. It ap-
peaied the landlord qualified for a religious exemption from the hous-
ing discrimination law in all circumstances. However, the California
Supreme Court granted review of Smith v. FEHC245 and then re-
versed the pro-landlord trend.24 6
In the California Supreme Court's Smith v. FEHC plurality deci-
sion, the court first affirmed the holdings of lower courts that the mar-
ital status discrimination statute indeed applied to prohibit
discrimination against unmarried couples in rental housing.247 The
court next turned to the more interesting question: whether the eld-
erly widow landlord was entitled to a religious exemption from the
law. The court divided its analysis into three sections, each dealing
with a different source for free exercise exemption analysis: E.D. v.
Smith;248 the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),2 49 and the
California Constitution.250 Under the first, the court noted that the
E.D. v. Smith decision determined that an exemption was not avail-
able to a valid law of neutral and general applicability.25' This flat
rule leaves necessary only the determination of whether the marital
status prohibition was such a law. The California Supreme Court con-
cluded that the housing law, California Government Code section
12955, prohibited discrimination regardless of the motivation-reli-
gious or otherwise-and was therefore neutral and generally applica-
ble.252 Therefore, section 12955 did not violate the free exercise
clause.25 3
The court then turned to RFRA which restores the Sherbert254
and Yoder255 standards of scrutiny. Under RFRA, the traditional ex-
emption analysis is conducted and the compelling governmental inter-
est standard is only applied after two prerequisites are met. First, the
court found the landlord's beliefs to be sincerely held.256 The landlord
believed she would not be reunited with her deceased husband in the
afterlife if she rented to the unmarried couple.257 The plurality then
addressed whether the landlord's religious beliefs were substantially
burdened by the discrimination statute. It is at this point that the Cal-
245. 880 P.2d 111 (1994).
246. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
247. Id. at 918.
248. Id. at 919-21.
249. Id. at 921-29.
250. 913 P.2d 909 at 929-31.
251. Id. at 919.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
255. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
256. 913 P.2d at 923.
257. Id. at 912.
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ifornia court differs from the analyses of other state supreme courts,
because it determined the case by finding the landlord was not sub-
stantially burdened.
258
The plurality struggled with crafting a test for substantial burden.
The opinion identified three factors to consider in making the substan-
tial burden determination. First, if the party seeking a religious ex-
emption can voluntarily avoid the conflict without violating her
religious beliefs, the law does not substantially burden her.259 The
court said that if Mrs. Smith, the landlord, "does not wish to comply
with an antidiscrimination law that conflicts with her religious beliefs,
[she can] avoid the conflict, without threatening her livelihood, by
selling her units and redeploying the capital in other investments.
'260
The plurality also noted that her religion did not compel her to rent
apartments.
Second, economic costs incurred because of the law conflicting
with religious beliefs are not enough to render a burden substantial.261
In this case, expenses would presumably arise from Mrs. Smith selling
her rental units to avoid the ramifications of the law conflicting with
her beliefs. Finally, if accommodation of the religious beliefs would
impact third parties-here, the tenants-a burden is not substan-
tial.262 The court stated that the above three elements did not of
themselves comprise a substantial burden test, but were factors to
consider.263 In the instant case, the court applied the three factors and
found the required burden lacking; thus, the court did not determine
whether the government demonstrated a compelling governmental in-
terest in prohibiting marital status discrimination or that the law rep-
resented the least restrictive means to accomplishing the legislative
purpose. Said the court, "In short, were we to grant the requested
accommodation, Smith would have more freedom and greater protec-
tion for her own rights and interests, while [the tenants] would have
less freedom and less protection. '264
The court then turned to the final, state constitutional analysis,
and utilizing some interesting twists and turns of logic, determined
that the state constitution also did not protect Mrs. Smith. The plural-
ity initially declined to pinpoint the level of free exercise protection
granted by the California Constitution. It noted that some past free
exercise cases were decided under an analysis similar to pre-E.D. v.
258. Id. at 923-29.
259. Id. at 925-26.
260. Id. at 925.
261. 913 P.2d at 926-27.
262. Id. at 928.
263. Id. at 926-29.
264. Id. at 928.
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Smith cases-utilizing the strict scrutiny standard,265 but also observed
that older cases "suggest an approach closer to that of... [E.D. v.
Smith]. '266 The court then stated that under either approach, given
the analyses under E.D. v. Smith and RFRA discussed previously,
Smith loses.267 Under the former analysis, the housing discrimination
law is neutral and generally applicable and therefore bars the landlord
from obtaining an exemption. Under RFRA, the strict scrutiny analy-
sis is applied, but because the California Supreme Court had already
determined that the landlord's case for an exemption failed to satisfy
the burden element, it reasoned that an exemption could not be ob-
tained under a California constitutional analysis utilizing strict
scrutiny.
However, it is settled law that state constitutions may provide
greater free exercise protections than are guaranteed under the Fed-
eral Constitution. The fact that Smith loses under E.D. v. Smith and
RFRA should not then end the inquiry. Yet, the court declined to
assess whether California offers broader protections than does the
Federal Constitution, saying that "[t]hese important questions should
await a case in which their resolution affects the outcome.
268 So, it is
difficult to assess under which standard cases involving California's
free exercise clause should be analyzed. Further, the court, in a foot-
note, leaves open the qluestion whether the California constitutional
reference to "liberty of conscience" provides extended free exercise
protections.269
The plurality opinion was joined by three justices. However, a
concurring opinion provided the fourth vote for the tenants' victory.
The concurring justice, however, determined that RFRA was an un-
constitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of powers27° and,
therefore, afforded Mrs. Smith no measure of protection. Thus, under
E.D. v. Smith, the tenants prevail.
Two dissenting opinions, together representing three votes, deter-
mined that Mrs. Smith's religious beliefs were substantially burdened.
265. Id. at 930-31.
266. 913 P.2d at 930.
267. Id. at 930-31.
268. Id. at 931.
269. Id at 931 n.22. Not only did the plurality fail to determine the level of protections
afforded under the "liberty of conscience" provision, it did not question whether the land-
lord's options-other than selling her business-which the Baxter dissent names, impose
the requisite burden. l at 971-72 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting). By failing to
assess the burden imposed should Smith continue to refuse to rent, suffering statutory pen-
alties, or rent, suffering sin, guilt, etc., the plurality leaves open the question of whether
non-economic detriment can be a constitutionally-significant burden in California, so as to
necessitate continuing to the next phase of the exemption analysis, balancing free exercise
against the discrimination law.
270. 913 P.2d at 937 (Mosk, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennard observed that the plurality failed to discern a gov-
erning principle with respect to the substantial burden question.
271
Justice Kennard, however, found four elements which, if present, de-
termine whether a substantial burden exists:
(1) a religious adherent engages in a particular activity; (2) a gov-
ernmental command relating to the activity conflicts with the adher-
ent's religious beliefs concerning the activity; (3) the conflict is
irreconcilable (that is, to satisfy the governmental command the ad-
herent must either abandon the activity or violate his or her religious
beliefs); and (4) the detriment to the adherent from abandoning the
activity creates substantial secular pressure on the adherent to violate
his or her religious beliefs rather than abandon the activity.272
Kennard found all the above elements met and disputed the plu-
rality's opinion that the fact that Smith's religion did not compel her
to rent apartments was a factor in finding substantial burden lack-
ing.273 Rather, a burden exists because the discrimination law "condi-
tions receipt of [a] ... benefit [that is, the right to engage in the rental
housing business] upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith,
... thereby putting substantial pressure on [her] to modify [her] be-
havior and to violate [her] beliefs. '274 Further, Mrs. Smith was subject
to civil penalties and a cease-and-desist order, which potentially could
expose her to fines and imprisonment if she continued to refuse to
rent to unmarried couples.275
Finally, Justice Kennard disputed each of the plurality's three fac-
tors of its substantial burden analysis. She was unpersuaded that the
fact Smith can "redeploy her capital" should affect the analysis.276
Nor did she believe the fact that a religious exemption would affect
third parties-tenants-should be a factor. "The purpose of the sub-
stantial burden inquiry is to determine whether further judicial inquiry
is warranted into the state's justifications for the burden it has im-
posed on an individual's exercise of religious beliefs"277-namely, to
determine if balancing under the compelling governmental interest
test is warranted. "To consider at . . . [this] stage ... the third party
impact of a hypothetical [religious] accommodation.., subverts this
purpose.... Using them to negate the substantial burden on Smith
and thereby avdid reaching the compelling interest test results in a
271. Id. at 943 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 945.
274. Id. at 944 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-
18 (1981)).
275. 913 P.2d at 945.
276. Id. at 945.
277. Id. at 948.
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blind deference to state policy judgments infringing religious
freedom." 278
Justice Kennard further disputed the plurality's contention that
the expense incurred because of the law-arising from its assumption
(and direction) that she sell out of the business-is not enough to sat-
isfy the burden requirement. Kennard stated that free exercise deci-
sions "demonstrate that a conflict between government laws and an
individual's religious beliefs substantially burdens the exercise of reli-
gion in cases where the believer cannot avoid the conflict except by
abandoning participation, in the activity that gives rise to the
conflict."279
Kennard's dissent, therefore, found the burden element met, and
turned to the question of the two showings the government must
make to justify the law's burden-that the law serves a compelling
interest and is the least restrictive means to accomplishing the govern-
ment's purpose. She determined that it was "questionable" whether
the government proved a compelling interest and noted that the gov-
ernment, interestingly, had sought to prove that all forms of discrimi-
nation-and discrimination as a whole-are "equally invidious" and
"the state has an equally compelling interest in eliminating all of
them. ' 280 Justice Kennard disputed this assertion, noting that there is
no history of invidious discrimination against unmarried couples as
there is with respect to race, gender, and ethnicity.28 In the end, she
declined to resolve whether eliminating marital status discrimination
was a compelling governmental interest, because she found that the
government failed to prove that the state could not accomplish its pur-
poses by less restrictive means.282 Because Justice Kennard deter-
mined that Smith was protected under RFRA, she did not need to
proceed with a federal or state constitutional analysis.
Justice Baxter, joined by Chief Justice Lucas, also dissented. Un-
like Justice Kennard, Justice Baxter would remand the case to the Fair
Employment & Housing Commission, which first determined Smith
impermissibly violated the housing discrimination law, because RFRA
was not in effect at the time the Commission originally heard the
case.283 In proceeding to analyze the conflicts issue under RFRA, the
dissent initially noted that Mrs. Smith had three options available to
her: (1) rent to the couple and violate her beliefs; (2) refuse to rent,
violate the law and, therefore, incur statutory penalties (which "in-
clude increasingly severe criminal penalties for continuing viola-
278. Id.
279. Id. at 949.
280. 913 P.2d at 951-52.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 954.
283. Id. at 958 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
tions"); or (3) get out of the rental business.2 84 This observation is
notable because Baxter sees more alternatives for Mrs. Smith-each
of which present some degree of burden to her and should be consid-
ered under the burden analysis-while the lead opinion only consid-
ered redeployment of capital as an option imposing a burden on Mrs.
Smith.285 He observed that the plurality's result and reasoning is in
concert with E.D. v. Smith-supposedly no longer the law, and not
with RFRA. He noted that, like E.D. v. Smith, the lead opinion re-
quires Smith to comply with laws that are "valid and neutral... [and
of] general applicability," or to take her capital elsewhere. 286
Baxter further argued that the fact that Smith's religion does not
require that she rent apartments for a living is inapposite; her religion
does compel her to refuse to rent to unmarried couples and that is
where the conflict with the law arises. Indeed, the lead opinion fo-
cused on the commercial (and voluntary) nature of Mrs. Smith's activ-
ity; it emphasized the economic effects of the law on her, the effects of
her actions on third parties (arising out of the commercial context of
the exchange between the tenants and Smith), and the mobility of
capital. Baxter, on the other hand, stated: "Although the extent of
the 'economic' burden a challenged statute imposes on the believer is
clearly a factor that can be weighed ... it is not determinative of the
question of 'substantial burden' where, as here, it can be shown that
compliance with the law conflicts with the believer's fundamental reli-
gious beliefs. '287 In fact, he observed that the plurality's substantial
burden factors represent considerations that would correctly be made
under the compelling governmental interest and least restrictive
means analyses. To illustrate, he quoted the majority's statement that
granting a religious exemption would grant Mrs. Smith "more free-
dom and greater protection for her own rights... while [the tenants]
would have less freedom and less protection. 2 88 He noted that con-
sideration of that fact does not belong in the substantial burden
analysis.
In finding the substantial burden requirement met, Baxter com-
mended the observations of the lower court that Mrs. Smith could not
"remain faithful to her religious convictions and beliefs and yet rent to
unmarried couples. If faced with that choice, [Smith] testified her...
rental units will 'stay vacant.' The Commission's order penalizes
[Smith] for her religious belief .... -289 Baxter then turned to the
284. Id. at 965.
285. See text accompanying note 260.
286. Smith, 913 P.2d at 965.
287. Id. at 968.
288. Id. at 968 (quoting lead opinion at 928).
289. Id. at 971 (quoting Smith v. FEHC, 30 Cal Rptr. 2d 395, rev. granted, 880 P.2d 111
(Cal. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996)).
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compelling governmental interest question. He concluded that the
proscribed grounds of discrimination in the law were not intended to
be given equal emphasis: race discrimination, for example, commands
strict scrutiny, but marital status does not.290 Though Baxter implied
that marital status protection was not a compelling state interest, he
addressed the issue of least restrictive means.291 Baxter felt that
granting religious exemptions to the law would be neither administra-
tively burdensome to the courts, nor economically detrimental to the
housing market.292 Baxter concluded that, considering the above, the
state would bear a challenging burden of showing least restrictive
means.
Finally, Baxter added a criticism of the lead opinion's overall
analysis. He found fault with the plurality's failure to address the con-
flicts issue pursuant to the state constitution. States are bound to offer
at least the level of protection afforded by the Federal Constitution,
but, in their own constitutions, can guarantee further protections.
Thus, when a person is not protected by the Federal Constitution, the
analysis does not end. It must still be determined whether the person
is aided by broader state guarantees. In Mrs. Smith's case, the plural-
ity simply passed on the state constitutional issue by stating that,
under whatever level of protection California offers, the state's free
exercise protections had, until that time, never been greater than as
guaranteed by Sherbert and, because Mrs. Smith loses under RFRA,
she would necessarily lose under the state constitution. Baxter found
fault with this analysis since Mrs. Smith's beliefs enjoy a measure of
protection under the state constitution. Baxter agreed with the con-
curring opinion in a 1991 California case, Sands v. Morongo Unified
School District, which stated that free exercise cases should first be
addressed pursuant to state constitutional principles, because they are
at least as expansive as the federal. 293
Thus, a plurality of the Supreme Court of California found in
favor of the tenants in this case. By determining that the discrimina-
tion law failed to burden the landlord's free exercise interest as a mat-
ter of law, balancing was not required. If the decision represents a
bright line rule in favor of tenants, it also represents a 180-degree turn
from the status of California law prior to the decision.
290. Id. at 972-73.
291. Smith, 913 P.2d at 974.
292. Id. at 974-75.




Like California, the Alaska Supreme Court found for the injured
tenants. In Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,294 the
state challenged a landlord's policy against renting to unmarried
couples under Alaska's housing discrimination law.295 Swanner, a
religious landlord, believed that living with the opposite sex while un-
married constituted a sin, even if the couple's relationship was non-
sexual, because the living arrangement still suggested immorality.2 96
Swanner claimed he was entitled to an exemption from the law under
both the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions.
The court first determined that "marital status" protections are
intended to benefit cohabitating couples.297 Turning to federal free
exercise jurisprudence, the Alaska court cited E.D. v. Smith's holding
that generally applicable and neutral laws did not require satisfaction
of the strict scrutiny standard to justify burdening religious free exer-
cise.298 The Swanner court found that Alaska's housing discrimination
law was facially neutral and generally applicable,2 99 and that applica-
tion of the compelling interest standard to balance the two interests
was not warranted. 300 Further, because the landlord did not contend
that any additional rights were burdened by the discrimination law,
the E.D. v. Smith "hybrid" situation, and corresponding necessity to
apply strict scrutiny, was not implicated.301
The analysis under the Alaska Constitution was not so simple.
Alaskan precedent,302 the court stated, requires application of the
Sherbert strict scrutiny standard.30 3 But before the case warrants such
balancing, three requirements must be met. The religious landlord
must show that: 1) a religion is involved; 2) the illegal conduct is relig-
iously based; and 3) the landlord is sincere in his belief.3 4 The court
found that all three requirements were met in this case.305
294. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
295. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1994).
296. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 277.
297. Id. at 278.
298. Id. at 279.
299. Id. at 280.
300. Id. The court also acknowledged the recent passage of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and its purpose of restoring Sherbert's compelling interest standard. How-
ever, the court then noted that an RFRA analysis was not necessary because the Alaska
constitutional analysis required a Sherbert analysis and yielded the same results as Smith,
without it. 874 P.2d at 280 n.9.
301. Id.
302. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
303. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282.
304. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1071 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16(1972)).
305. 874 P.2d at 281-82. Alaska does not have a substantial burden requirement.
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The court next turned to the compelling government interest
question. They conducted a unique analysis of the state's interest in
protecting against marital status discrimination. Rather than simply
determining, as some of the previous cases have, whether eliminating
marital status discrimination is a compelling interest, the court posited
that the real question is "whether that interest ... will suffer if an
exemption is granted to accommodate the religious practice at is-
sue."306 Alaska's definition of the strict scrutiny test is suspicious. It
seems rather obvious that when two interests conflict and one must
prevail over the other, the losing interest will suffer.
The court further confused the issue by finding the government
has two interests: "a 'derivative' interest in ensuring access to housing
for everyone, and a 'transactional' interest in preventing individual
acts of discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics. '307 The de-
rivative interest is ensuring equal access to housing. The transactional
interest is preventing specific discriminatory acts based on "irrelevant
characteristics. ' 308 In a case involving a derivative interest where the
complaining party did not suffer in the end-i.e., found housing de-
spite one discriminatory event-the court seemed to say it would be
easy to grant an exemption because the derivative interest is main-
tained, and the overall governmental goal is undeterred. However, if
the case involved a transactional interest and the infraction occurred
because the law and that interest were directly violated, such an ex-
emption would not be granted. That is, if the intent of the law is to
prevent individual discriminatory incidents in the housing area, viola-
tions of the housing discrimination law would not be accepted even on
religious grounds.30 9 The court further noted that rental activity is
commercial in nature and the landlord enters into the business volun-
tarily.310 Therefore, according to the court, any burden on the land-
lord is self-imposed. Thus, Alaska provides less free exercise
protection in voluntary commercial endeavors than for "directly reli-
gious activity." 31' Finding a transactional interest involved in this
case, which would suffer if an exemption were granted, the court de-
nied the exemption.312
Alaska has effectively determined that, under two very different
analyses, no religious exemptions would be granted. On one level, the
opinion in Swanner seemed to hold that a court has only to determine
whether a derivative or transactional interest is at stake in a conflicts
306. Id. at 282 (quoting Frank, 604 P.2d at 1073).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 282-83.
310. 874 P.2d at 283.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 282-84.
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case to decide whether a free exercise exemption is warranted. How-
ever, the Alaska Supreme Court clearly balanced free exercise against
the discrimination law. Though the majority referred to the standard
used in balancing as one requiring a "compelling government inter-
est," they define that standard by stating that the religious interest
fails (and the standard supposedly is met) if the discrimination interest
would suffer as a result of granting exemptions to the law. Thus, with
respect to the Sherbert test, it is doubtful that the standard being ap-
plied is truly the same high standard referred to in Yoder, Desilets, and
French.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Moore argued there is no precedent
for the derivative/transactional analysis31 3 and undertook to balance
the competing interests in the traditional manner using the Sherbert
compelling government interest standard.314 The Chief Justice found
that the compelling interest standard applied if the category sought to
be protected from discrimination was a historically disadvantaged
group.315 While race and gender would qualify, not all categories of
discrimination are equally as "invidious. '316 Because there is no his-
tory in Alaska of unfair treatment on the basis of marital status,
Moore concluded that the prohibition of marital status discrimination
did not constitute a competing interest "of the highest order, ' 317 war-
ranting heightened scrutiny to protect that category. He further com-
mented that a compelling government interest need be shown
regardless of whether free exercise is burdened in a commercial set-
ting.318 Finally, the dissent concluded that an exemption was in
order.319
B. The Analysis
All four state supreme court cases320 share some similarities, but
they also differ dramatically in terms of their analyses and their re-
sults. First, all of the cases determined whether their state's prohibi-
tion of marital status discrimination applied to protect unmarried
cohabitating couples. The courts then turned to tests established pur-
suant to the federal or their respective state constitutions to determine
whether a free exercise exemption should be granted to the religious
landlord. Some states' analyses proceeded through all stages of the
313. Id. at 286-87 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 286.
315. 874 P.2d at 287.
316. Id. at 287-88.
317. Id. at 287.
318. Id. at 290.
319. Id. at 291.
320. In this subsection, the two California Court of Appeals cases are removed from
the analysis, except where expressly noted.
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tests, but other states did not find it necessary to tackle the final in-
quiry-the balancing step-because initial prerequisites were not met.
Finally, the states' courts employed various reasoning to arrive at or
explain their conclusions. Some strains of similarity can be found.
This subsection will separate each step of the process to focus on areas
of agreement among the states and areas of sharp dissention.
(1) Application of the Marital Status Statute to Unmarried Couples
All four state supreme courts began their analyses by determining
whether refusing to rent to unmarried couples violated state marital
status discrimination laws. Three states, Alaska, California, and Mas-
sachusetts, determined that their statutes were violated.321 However,
in Minnesota, the question was answered in the negative. 322 Though
three justices from the majority and the dissent continued to address
the exemption analysis, the majority holding established conclusively
that religious landlords in Minnesota are free to refuse to rent to un-
married couples.
(2) The First Prerequisite in the Free Exercise Exemption Test-A
Sincerely Held Belief
This requirement was a non-issue in all four high court cases.
None of the state supreme courts questioned that the landlords' be-
liefs were anything but sincerely-held.
(3) The Second Prerequisite in the Free Exercise Exemption Test-A
Substantial Burden
This requirement only entered into the analyses of three states
since Alaska does not require that the landlord show a substantial
burden. However, only in California was the issue dispositive.
Both the majority justices and the dissenters in Massachusetts
found conclusively that the landlord's beliefs were substantially bur-
dened by the discrimination prohibition.323 Likewise, the three jus-
tices joining the second part of the Minnesota majority, discussing the
exemption analysis in dicta, found a substantial burden.324 And
though the three Minnesota dissenters questioned the finding of a
burden because the violations took place in a commercial context,325
321. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 278; Smith v. FEHC, 913 P.2d 909, 914 (Cal. 1996); Attorney
Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994).
322. State v. French, 460 N.W2d 2, 6 (Minn. 1990).
323. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 237-38 (majority); Id. at 246 (dissent).
324. French, 460 N.W.2d at 9-10.
325. Id. at 14-15 (discussing burden requirement).
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they said the landlord's beliefs were burdened and continued with
their analysis.3 26
Only in California did the plurality opinion turn on the burden
issue.327 That state's supreme court determined that economic detri-
ment as a result of the discrimination law-presumably incurred be-
cause the landlord would opt to sell out of the business rather than to
sin or to suffer statutory penalties-does not satisfy the substantial
burden requirement.32 8 According to Smith v. FEHC, the religious
landlord is not sufficiently burdened even though the regulatory law
imposes financial costs on him. Further, the lead opinion reasoned
that the landlord was not sufficiently burdened because excusing her
violation of the law-by granting her an exemption-would affect
third parties,329 and she could voluntarily avoid the conflict with the
law by selling her units and entering another business. 330
Responding to the argument that the landlord can simply leave
the rental business, the three justices on the majority of Minnesota's
decision found the resulting economic burden significant.331 They de-
termined that the decision to sell out is no decision at all because the
need for rental income may be just as great as the need for wage in-
come.332 Hence, if the landlord were to leave the business, the rental
income would correspondingly cease, and a burden would be imposed.
The California court also fails to discuss noneconomic burdens,
such as the resulting guilt, sin, or mental burden of believing that one
is eternally damned by renting to unmarried couples or the statutory
penalty if the law is violated.333 However, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court did address noneconomic burden. They found that the discrim-
ination law made religious exercise more difficult, more costly, re-
quired landlords to enter into religiously undesirable contracts,
326. Id. at 15.
327. See Smith v. FEHC, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996). It is questionable whether the sub-
stantial burden analysis carried four votes. Only three joined the lead opinion. The fourth
vote for the result concurred separately, determining RFRA was unconstitutional and,
therefore, offered no measure of protection for Mrs. Smith. Since E.D. v. Smith's analysis
does not have a substantial burden element, it is unclear whether the concurring vote joins
in the lead opinion's burden analysis.
328. Id. at 929.
329. Id. at 925. The logical flaw is self-evident.
330. Id. at 929.
331. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990). This determination was included as
part of the statutory interpretation, and arguably, has four votes-a majority.
332. ld.
333. One of the dissenting opinions, however, pointed out the error of addressing only
one possible burden resulting from the conflict with the law-coercion to sell the business
to avoid the conflict-without considering whether other options available to Mrs. Smith
present a sufficient burden. The other options are: (1) renting to the couple and suffering
sin and guilt; or (2) refusing to rent and incurring statutory penalties. Smith v. FEHC, 913
P.2d 909, 965 (Cal. 1996) (Baxter, J., dissenting).
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penalized violations motivated by religious conduct, and stigmatized
the landlords in the public eye for their religious practices. 34 In all
these ways, the court found substantial burden.
Also, the California Supreme Court declines to determine
whether a provision in the state's constitution referring to "liberty of
conscience" provides more free exercise protections to the landlord
seeking an exemption to the violated law.335 Indeed, "liberty of con-
science" seems to be exactly what all of the religious landlords in
these cases are seeking, and the phrase reflects the type of burden
Mrs. Smith tried to argue she would suffer by renting to unmarried
couples.
The California analysis is interesting for another reason. Not
only does the lead opinion fail to assess whether non-economic bur-
dens can satisfy the requirement, but the entirety of the substantial
burden inquiry fails to focus on the burden on Mrs. Smith's beliefs.
Presumably, the substantial burden element tests whether a person's
religious beliefs are so infringed that the state need justify the conflict-
ing law; such an issue appears to focus on the individual in the context
of her beliefs. The lead opinion, however, limits its substantial burden
inquiry to three elements: (1) the voluntary, commercial nature of the
landlord's activity; (2) the expense imposed by the law; and (3) the
effects of exempting a person from the law. The first and second fail
to focus on the individual or her beliefs and the last jumps the gun by
assessing the end results of a balancing analysis prior to its applica-
tion. More importantly, it too fails to focus on the landlord's beliefs.
.In summary, the states are not only divided in terms of finding a
substantial burden sufficient to satisfy this second exemption analysis
prerequisite, but they are also divided in terms of the types of burden
that will suffice. Massachusetts, in both the majority and dissenting
opinions, conclusively found a burden and the majority even indicated
that noneconomic burden satisfied the requirement. The California
majority just as squarely found no burden and limited its analysis to
financial detriment in a commercial setting. Finally, the three justices
from Minnesota's lead opinion found a burden in dicta, as did the dis-
sent which initially questioned whether the commercial context al-
tered the analysis. One thing is clear after Smith v. FEHC, however:
at least in California, the substantial burden question is no longer one
to be passed over without considerable debate.
334. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 237-38 (Mass. 1994).
335. Smith, 913 P.2d at 931 n.22.
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(4) The Balancing Test-Application of the Compelling Governmental
Interest Standard
Only three of the four states ever actually balanced free exercise
against the discrimination interest.3 36 And in only two of those three
states was the discussion dispositive of the case.337 California deter-
mined that the landlord lost on the substantial burden issue, and
therefore did not carry its analysis further. In Minnesota, a majority
of four justices disposed of the case at the statutory interpretation
level. Though three of those four justices did continue the analysis,
their discussion in dicta was equally opposed by three dissenting
justices.
Of those two state supreme court cases whose outcomes de-
pended on the balancing analysis, one was decided in favor of the
landlord338 and the other in favor of the tenants.339 Further, both
cases had a clear majority. 340 The Alaska Supreme Court, per curiam,
determined that its state had a "compelling interest" in eliminating
marital status discrimination in housing, such that the landlord was
not entitled to an exemption. 341 Only one dissenter disagreed.
342
Moreover, in Massachusetts, the court did not reach the balancing is-
sue, but its guidelines to the lower court implied that the state had a
very difficult showing to make in order to win343 and hinted that such
a high standard could not be satisfied. The dissent emphasized the
free exercise interest even further by conclusively finding that the
state did not have a case, and therefore, the landlord should prevail.
3"4
Thus, entirely different results were reached by large majorities in the
two cases where the balancing issue was dispositive. The outcomes of
future conflicts cases are therefore quite uncertain.
(5) The "Commerce" Argument
The states/tenants commonly argue that the landlord's beliefs
cannot be found burdened, or that the landlord is not entitled to the
336. Alaska, Massachusetts, and Minnesota.
337. Alaska and Massachusetts.
338. Massachusetts.
339. Alaska.
340. Alaska: 6-1. Massachusetts: effectively unanimous with respect to reaching a
pro-free exercise result. Both states disposing of their cases without balancing-California
and Minnesota-had sharply split courts; each case was decided by a 4-3 vote.
341. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska
1994) (holding the discrimination interest would "clearly 'suffer"' if an exemption were
granted, thus satisfying Alaska's lenient "compelling interest" standard), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 460 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
342. Id. at 286 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
343. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994).
344. Id. at 246-47 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
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full measure of free exercise protection, because he has voluntarily
entered into a commercial enterprise which is regulated by law. The
court's acceptance or rejection of this argument, obviously, has corre-
sponded with the outcome-pro-landlord or pro-tenant-reached.
The majorities in California and Alaska, as well as the minority in
Minnesota, shared pro-tenant views and wrote of the commercial con-
text of the landlords' activities as being relevant to the analysis of the
case. Only in one of the three, Alaska, did the commerce circum-
stance warrant the state providing lesser religious freedom protections
than provided for "directly religious activity." 345 In the other two
states, the commercial nature of the rental business went to the sub-
stantial burden requirement.
346
The Minnesota minority questioned whether a burden could
properly be found when the landlord's activity was of a business na-
ture, but it eventually found the substantial burden requirement
met.347 For California, however, the commerce argument went to the
substantial burden requirement and the majority, finding no burden,
decided the case at that phase.348 The court observed that the land-
lord had voluntarily entered into the housing business, a commercial
enterprise regulated by religion-neutral laws, including the discrimina-
tion law at issue.349 Therefore, in the three opinions above, the com-
mercial context of the landlord's violation was partially dispositive, at
best, and worthy of discussion, at least.
On the other hand, the Minnesota and Massachusetts majorities,
Alaska dissent, and one of the California dissents in favor of the reli-
gious landlords downplayed the commerce element. To the extent
that they acknowledge that the commerce argument may play a role in
345. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283.
346. Substantial burden is not a requirement in Alaska.
347. Minnesota ex rel Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 14-15 (Minn. 1990) (discussing
the burden requirement).
348. Smith v. FEHC, 913 P.2d 909, 929 (Cal. 1996).
349. Id. at 928-29. The landlord was free to invest her capital in another business and
presumably, therefore, incurred the burden on herself by remaining in the rental business.
Also, the commercial context was further made a factor due to the court's inclusion of the
effects on third pafties on exempting the landlord's discrimination. The commercial as-
pects of the exchange between landlord and tenant are brought to the forefront of the
inquiry. The court said, "[t]o say [the tenants] may rent elsewhere is also to deny them the
right to be treated equally by commercial enterprises .... Id. at 928. In short, that the
court views the commercial context as central to its analysis is revealed in the court's own
summary of the essential facts guiding its determination. They are: "Smith's religion does
not require her to rent apartments, nor is investment in rental units the only available
income-producing use of her capital. Thus, she can avoid the burden on her religious exer-
cise .... The asserted burden is the result ... of a religion-neutral law that happens to
operate in a way that makes Smith's religious exercise more expensive.... [T1o grant the
requested accommodation ... would necessarily impair the rights and interests of third
parties." Ia at 928-29.
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the analysis, it is unclear at what stage of the process they would ac-
knowledge and render relevant the business context in which the vio-
lation took place.
The Minnesota court addressed the commerce argument in the
context of determining whether the anti-discrimination statute applied
to unmarried couples. However, the extent to which the commerce
contention fits into the court's determination that the statute did not
apply to protect such couples is unclear. The state argued that the
landlord "gave up his constitutional rights 'by entering the public mar-
ketplace.' '350 But the court then uses "burden" language that, in the
context of an exemption analysis, would indicate that the commerce
contention is being rejected as applied to the substantial burden ques-
tion. The court indicates that the landlord would be burdened by hav-
ing to sell his business because of the discrimination statute, and then
asks, "[W]hat burden is imposed on [the tenant] to enable her to rent,
but not live with her fianc6 on the premises?" 351 Thus, the Minnesota
majority seems to reject the commerce argument, but whether the re-
jection is wholesale is unclear. Further, the discussion of the com-
merce context did not take place in the portion of the opinion one
would expect-the exemption analysis.
While rejecting the consideration of the commerce element with
respect to the substantial burden question, the Massachusetts court
indicated that the trial court should consider it when balancing inter-
ests on remand.352 Since both the majority and dissent were con-
cerned with protecting religious freedom, the commerce element was
one of few elements that the state would have in its favor to argue on
remand.
However, the dissent in the Alaska opinion, Swanner, rejected
the commerce contention in its entirety. Responding to the majority
contention that the commercial context minimizes the constitutional
protection afforded the landlord, the lone dissenter stated, "[No case]
of which I am aware stands for the proposition that individu-
als ... altogether waive their constitutional right to the free exercise
of religion simply because a conflict between their religious faith and
some legislation occurs in a commercial context. ' 353 He opined that
the state would have to show a compelling interest, regardless of the
context.354
350. French, 460 N.W.2d at 7-8.
351. Id. at 8.
352. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 238 (Mass. 1994).
353. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 290 (Alaska 1994)




Justice Kennard's dissent in Smith v. FEHC indicates an aware-
ness that the commerce element guided the lead opinion's reasoning,
but she does not refute the element as a consideration in the same
direct manner as does the dissent in the Alaska case.355 Responding,
however, to the lead opinion's reasoning that the landlord is not bur-
dened because her religious beliefs do not compel her to rent apart-
ments, the dissent stated, "[The landlord's] beliefs do not compel
participation in the [voluntary commercial] activity but participation
on the government's terms necessarily violates those beliefs."356 Finally,
the dissent disagreed with the plurality's personification of the land-
lord as a typical investor by observing, "Smith . . . is not a passive
investor who receives investment income without personal effort. She
earns her income by actively managing her rental property."35 7
Therefore, rather than tackling the issue of whether the commerce el-
ement should be a factor in conflicts cases, both the plurality and dis-
sent in California argued micro-factors358 and landlord personification
to determine whether the landlord is substantially burdened.
In general, judges rejected the commercial context argument, or
minimized its effects, if they tended towards protecting the landlord's
free exercise interests. And, on the other hand, decisions for the ten-
ant and the discrimination interest included the commercial element
in various parts of their reasoning.
(6) The Hierarchy of Discrimination Categories Argument
In all four cases discussed above, the courts conducted their anal-
yses focusing only on marital status discrimination. The courts did not
balance free exercise against discrimination as a whole.35 9 However,
several opinions and dissents discussed the argument that not all cate-
gories of discrimination protection-race, gender, marital status,
etc.-should receive the same level of protection in the course of de-
termining whether eradicating marital status discrimination was a
compelling governmental interest. The courts noted that some cate-
gories, such as race, have been protected longer than others and have
suffered long histories of invidious discrimination such that the eradi-
355. In fact, the lead opinion never explicitly stated that the commerce element gov-
erns-or is a factor-but rather, crafted three factors to determine the substantial burden
question. It is readily apparent, however, that each of the three reflect that the commerce
element is a primary consideration.
356. Smith v. FEHC, 913 P.2d 909, 945 (Cal. 1996) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
357. Id. at 946-47.
358. See text accompanying notes 247-93.
359. In California, however, the government tried to argue that all forms of discrimina-
tion were equally invidious. But the lead opinion did not need to address the hierarchy




cation of discrimination on those bases are considered to be govern-
ment interests of tremendous importance. Thus, courts have argued
in some conflicts cases that eradicating marital status discrimination is
not a compelling governmental interest. The contention assumes that
categories of discrimination are arranged in a hierarchy-hence, a "hi-
erarchy of discrimination categories" argument.
The Massachusetts majority and dissent, the Alaska dissent, the
pre-Smith v. FEHC California Court of Appeal opinions, and Califor-
nia dissents, determined that race and/or gender discrimination cate-
gories receive the strongest protection of the courts.3 60 The
discussions in the above opinions indicate that in cases involving stat-
utes that protect against race or gender discrimination in housing, the
infringement of free exercise rights is allowed.
The dissent in Swanner reasoned that in situations where courts
have upheld anti-discrimination interests in lieu of a fundamental
right, the courts have stated why those particular prevailing anti-dis-
crimination interests deserve heightened scrutiny.361 The dissent cited
Bob Jones University v. United States,362 which upheld the Internal
Revenue Service's denial of the University's tax exempt status against
a free exercise claim because of the institution's race discrimination
practices, to illustrate the compelling interest in eliminating race dis-
crimination.363 Likewise the dissent also cited Roberts v. United States
Jaycees364 for the proposition that eradicating sex discrimination
would prevail over a free exercise claim.365
Further, both California Court of Appeal opinions366 discussed
the hierarchy. In Smith v. FEHC,367 the court of appeal stated that
cases of conflict involving racial discrimination will always receive
strict scrutiny on behalf of the anti-discrimination interest. Such re-
view was not warranted by marital status discrimination.368 In fact,
the court concluded, "It is reasonable... to postulate that the Legisla-
ture did not intend all such classifications to be equal.1369
Similarly, the court of appeal in Donahue noted that the focus in
a conflicts case should be on the particular category of discrimination
360. See discussion infra.
361. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274,287-88 (Alaska 1994)
(Moore, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
362. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
363. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 288.
364. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
365. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 288.
366. Both are depublished and one is expressly overruled.
367. Smith v. FEHC, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (1994), rev. granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).




and "where the state's interest lies in the hierarchy of its policies
which must be protected and promoted, even against constitutional
challenges. '370 The Donahue. court also noted the fundamental im-
portance of eradicating race discrimination and that, in the scheme of
discrimination categories, marital status discrimination did not rank
very high.
3 71
Like Justice Moore in the Swanner dissent, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court indicated that eradication of race and sex discrimina-
tion was of paramount importance. 372 Marital status discrimination
did not deserve the societal importance recognized by the court as did
race and sex discrimination.373 The Desilets court used the Massachu-
setts Constitution's "equality under the law" clause classifications of
"sex, race, color, creed' or national origin" to order its hierarchy of
discrimination grounds.374 Since marital status was not protected
under that clause, marital status discrimination did not merit a higher
standard of scrutiny.375
Finally, both California dissents noted that the governmental goal
of eliminating marital status discrimination is not as compelling as
eradicating race, ethnic, or gender discrimination. Justice Kennard
stated, "There is no recent history or present practice of invidious dis-
crimination against unmarried cohabiting heterosexual couples that is
remotely comparable to the disgraceful and unhappy history of racial,
ethnic, and gender discrimination. ' 376 Justice Baxter observed that,
while there was no indication that the legislature intended categories
to be arrayed in a hierarchy, there is also no evidence that they are to
be treated similarly.377 Not only did he find that marital status did not
deserve the same level of scrutiny as race,378 he also found protections
for unmarried cohabitating couples not as great as those provided
"single men and women, students, widows and widowers, divorced
persons, and unmarried persons with children"379-though all are cov-
ered under the same "marital status" category of the housing discrimi-
nation statute.
370. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44 [Depublished].
371. Id
372. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 239 (Mass. 1994).
373. Id
374. Id. However, the dissent in State v. French commented that there was no prece-
dent for distinguishing among types of discrimination and declined to do so. The analysis
continued by finding that eliminating marital status discrimination was a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. 460 N.W.2d at 2, 19 (Minn. 1990) (Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
375. Id.
376. Smith v. FEHC, 913 P.2d 909, 952 (Cal. 1996) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
377. Id. at 972 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
378. Id.
379. Id. at 973.
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Thus, the importance of eradicating discrimination per se did not
determine the balancing conducted by individual judges. Rather, the
relative importance of the specific discrimination category within a hi-
erarchy of such categories was used. As such, marital status discrimi-
nation did not receive much weight, and free exercise interests could
more easily prevail.
It is easy to conclude that the majority of opinions discussing the
hierarchy are those in favor of protecting the religious interest. The
hierarchy is one tool to minimize marital status protection by compar-
ing it to, and finding it of lesser importance than, other categories,
such as race and gender. When the minimized marital status interest
is balanced against the First Amendment free exercise interest, the
result in favor of free exercise is predictable.
On the other hand, it is equally predictable that pro-marital status
protection/pro-tenant decisions do not address the hierarchy argu-
ment.38 0 First, they have only to find that protecting against marital
status discrimination is a governmental interest of a compelling na-
ture. It is irrelevant that there are other categories of discrimination
which may be more compelling or that may receive different levels of
protection. Second, it is difficult to reason that marital status deserves
the protection that race and gender discrimination does, given that
marital status does not have a similar history of oppressive and invidi-
ous discrimination.
Finally, the fact that pro-tenant decisions do not address the hier-
archy analysis does not mean that an unstated hierarchy does not ex-
ist. Cases such as Bob Jones University v. United States and Roberts v.
United States Jaycees make clear that, absent a statutory exemption,
claims of race or gender discrimination will prevail over a free exer-
cise claim, because eradicating those forms of discrimination is a com-
pelling government interest. That conflicts cases arising in state
supreme courts have only involved marital status discrimination is evi-
dence that the balancing of this interest against free exercise is not so
easily resolved.
380. Only one such pro-tenant decision addresses the hierarchy argument. Chief Jus-
tice Popovich's dissent in State v. French states: "[The landlord] cites no cases breaking up
an anti-discrimination statute into discrete parts and finding the interest in eradicating cer-
tain types of discrimination to be less than compelling." 460 N.W.2d at 2, 19 (Minn. 1990)
(Popovich, C.J., dissenting). To the extent he rejects it, he misstates the hierarchy argu-
ment. The hierarchy supposes that categories of discrimination are arranged in some rela-
tive order of importance and that, therefore, they receive varying degrees of protection.
At some point amidst the vertically arranged categories, courts draw a horizontal line indi-
cating that those categories falling above the line are compelling, those below are not. The
hierarchy argument is a vehicle for arranging the categories along a vertical axis to begin
with. It does not place the horizontal dividing line. It is, of course, possible for the line to
be drawn below all of the categories, corresponding with a court's determination that all
are to receive strict scrutiny.
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Focusing on the above cases and the hierarchy argument, the case
studies posed in the introduction can be addressed. Case study three
involves a conflict between a race discrimination statute and free exer-
cise. Given the hierarchy analyses above, there appears to be no
question but that the tenant will prevail in this case. Race discrimina-
tion is not tolerated in the state jurisdictions discussed in this Note or
in the federal court system. Undoubtedly, a court facing such a situa-
tion will address the history behind the civil rights movement, the his-
tory behind the FHA or other applicable housing discrimination
statutes discussed in Part II of this Note, and the urgency felt in this
country to eradicate such discriminatory treatment of prospective
tenants.
In case study one, marital status discrimination protections are in
opposition to free exercise rights. A court in a jurisdiction whose con-
stitution grants broader free exercise protections than the First
Amendment will likely find for the landlord. It will likely discuss the
hierarchy, within which marital status discrimination is not given the
full measure of deference against a free exercise challenge-it is not
considered important enough to override state religious freedom
guarantees. It is likely that the court will go to great lengths in its
analysis to discuss the historical events giving rise to religious rights in
America as presented in Part I of this Note. And by virtue of that
history, great emphasis will be placed on the constitutional free exer-
cise language.
On the other hand, states not favoring the religious interest will
downplay the hierarchy argument or avoid it altogether. They may
assert that the interest competing with free exercise is not the specific
category of discrimination, but rather discrimination in housing as a
whole, and then find the interest in eradicating such discrimination
sufficient to burden free exercise. The court may also avoid the hier-
archy argument by never addressing the balancing of interests, as oc-
curred in California. By finding that the landlord failed to meet her
initial burden of proving a substantial burden, the California Supreme
Court never had to address the importance of eliminating marital sta-
tus discrimination.
Case study two addresses the rights of gays and lesbians. How-
ever, to date, no state housing discrimination law protects against dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.381 It is conceivable that
a housing discrimination claim based on sexual orientation is sex or
marital status discrimination. No such case has arisen and it is difficult
to assess the result a court would reach. Should a state add sexual
381. In fact, Colorado attempted to amend its constitution to refuse protective status to
gays and lesbians. See generally Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert granted,
115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
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orientation to its constitution's equal protection clause, the case for a
homosexual tenant or homosexual couple alleging discrimination
would be better. The remaining issue would be its relative placement
in the hierarchy.382
(7) The Degree to which State Constitutions, as Opposed to the Federal
Constitution, Protect Free Exercise Rights
The federal free exercise analysis, pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court's announcement in E.D. v. Smith, provides no exemp-
tion to a law burdening religious rights so long as the law is neutral
and generally applicable.3 83 Strict scrutiny is only mandated when an-
other constitutional right is infringed.3 84 RFRA, however, provides
that strict scrutiny is to be applied notwithstanding E.D. v. Smith. In
these state conflicts cases, however, each of the four state supreme
courts further looked-to varying degrees-to their respective state
constitutions to assess the standard of scrutiny that was required.
385
Minnesota and Massachusetts clearly stated that their state constitu-
tion provided broader free exercise protections than the Federal Con-
stitution and applied the strict scrutiny standard to find in favor of the
free exercise interest and the religious landlord.38 6 Alaska and Cali-
fornia, however, did not state that they would provide greater free
exercise protections and found for the unmarried, prospective tenants.
Thus, the relative degree of free exercise protection under the states'
382. In the California Supreme Court's Smith v. FEHC, Justice Kennard's dissent con-
tains an interesting footnote to this issue. She stated: "My discussion of whether the state
has carried its heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest addresses only
[the issue of religiously motivated discrimination against unmarried heterosexual couples.]
Analysis of whether there is a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
homosexual couples may well involve different considerations; homosexual couples have
been subject to a quite different, and continuing, history of discrimination; also, their un-
married status is not a matter of voluntary choice." Smith v. FEHC, 913 P.2d 909, 952 n.7
(Cal. 1996) (Kennard, J., dissenting). The comment is interesting because she does not
state whether the basis of a similar conflicts claim would also be the law protecting "marital
status." She did not observe that the law does not explicitly protect on the basis of sexual
orientation.
383. 494 U.S. at 872, 879 (1990).
384. Id. at 881.
385. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280 (Alaska 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 460 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Smith v. FEHC, 913 P.2d 909,
929; Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994); State v. French, 460
N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990).
386. To clarify, however, Massachusetts remanded the case for a determination of
whether the state had the requisite compelling interest. But the court hinted that the an-
swer should be in the negative. Also, though the Minnesota majority, quoted above, had
only three votes when addressing this issue, the dissent agreed that the compelling govern-
mental interest test should apply.
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constitutions can be an indicator of the result state courts will reach in
conflicts cases.
For example, Minnesota clearly stated that its constitution pro-
vided for greater free exercise rights than granted by the First Amend-
ment. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "[W]e interpret the
Minnesota Constitution as requiring a more stringent burden on the
state; it grants far more protection of religious freedom than the broad
language of the United States Constitution. '387 The state of Minne-
sota would have to satisfy the court, as required by its own state con-
stitution, that it had a compelling interest in eradicating marital status
discrimination in housing in order to overcome free exercise bur-
dens.388 Likewise, the Massachusetts Supreme Court determined that
it would apply the strict scrutiny standard articulated in Sherbert and
Yoder.389 The court stated, "By applying the balancing test as we do,
we extend protections to the [landlords] that are at least as great as
those of the First Amendment. '390
On the other hand, California and Alaska decided in favor of the
tenants and did not decisively state that their state constitutions of-
fered broader free exercise protections than the Federal Constitution.
Prior to the California Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. FEHC,
that state's courts of appeal opined that their state constitution did
offer such broader protections. Both Donahue391 and Smith v.
FEHC39 determined that the California Constitution offered such ex-
tended guarantees and required that the heightened standard of strict
scrutiny be applied. The California Supreme Court then confused the
matter in Smith v. FEHC. After dismissing with the landlord's claim
under a federal analysis, the court turned to its own constitution and
initially notes that "California courts have typically construed the
[free exercise] provision to afford the same protection for religious
exercise as the federal Constitution before [E.D. v. Smith]"-i.e. they
applied the Sherbert standard.393 The plurality then determined that
"[o]lder cases ... suggest an approach closer to that of... [E.D. v.
Smith] ... [requiring] ... the application to a religious objector of a
neutral, generally applicable law. '394 Without clarifying the issue, the
court concluded that the landlord's claim fails under either the lesser
E.D. v. Smith analysis or the more expansive Sherbert free exercise
387. French, 460 N.W.2d at 9.
388. Id.
389. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 236.
390. Id.
-391. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 39 [Depublished].
392. Smith v. FEHC, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 408-09 (1994), rev. granted, 880 P.2d 111
(Cal. 1994), affd in par4 rev'd in part, 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
393. Smith v. FEHC, 913 P.2d 909, 930 (Cal. 1996).
394. Id. at 930.
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analysis.395 Thus, the nature of California's free exercise rights is un-
certain. Further, as one dissent observed, the plurality failed to ad-
dress whether California's protections could offer broader protection
than those provided under either of the two proffered standards. 396
The extent of Alaska's free exercise protections is also unclear.
Pursuant to its state constitution, the majority initially appears ready
to apply a high level of scrutiny. The opinion states that the
"'[r]eligiously impelled actions can be forbidden only "where they
pose some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order," or
where there are competing governmental interests "of the highest or-
der and ... [which are] not otherwise served. . . .,,,397 The court
seems to be calling for the strict scrutiny standard. Yet the court later
articulates the meaning of this test and explains that the test poses the
question "'whether that [discrimination] interest, or any other, will
suffer if an exemption is granted to accommodate the religious prac-
tice at issue."' 398 This changes the analysis entirely. The rephrased
question is easily answered in the affirmative because it does not re-
quire that the discrimination interest be compelling or of a high order.
Rather, the interest, no matter what it is, need only "suffer" for the
religious exemption to be denied. Therefore, after meaning is at-
tached to the words, it does not appear that Alaska applies strict scru-
tiny to conflicts cases.
In summary, the two states that did not explicitly state that they
were applying the Sherbert / Yoder strict scrutiny standard found in
favor of the discrimination interest. Those states that determined to
apply such a high standard indicated, in the least, or concluded, at
most, that the religious interest should prevail.
C. A Solution to the Balancing Dilemma: The Status of the Landlord
Exception
A case involving an injury from another's illegal discriminatory
act and a free exercise defense for such an action presents the court
with a difficult conflict. Both free exercise protection and the initial
discrimination prohibition were essential, at the time of their ratifica-
395. Id. at 930-31.
396. Id. at 977 (Baxter, J. dissenting). Given the ultimate vote of four for the outcome,
and the three votes for the lead opinion leaving the issue open, there does not appear to be
significant support for the idea that free exercise protection is broader than would exist
under a Sherbert standard. Indeed, the Baxter dissent does not argue for broader protec-
tion, but rather points to the logical flaw in not at least addressing the possibility.
397. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 281 (Alaska 1994)
(quoting Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293, 1301 n.33 (Alaska 1982)
(quoting Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Alaska 1979))), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460
(1994).
398. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282 (quoting Frank, 604 P.2d at 1073).
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tion or passage, for the cohesion of the nation. Both were debated in
Congress and in the states. When threatened, both invite strong emo-
tional responses from highly organized groups of people.399
This Note has almost exclusively dealt with the conflict between
free exercise rights and statutory marital status discrimination protec-
tions, rather than general discrimination or other discrimination cate-
gories. I have distinguished among the categories because, in the
cases discussed, not all of the categories have received, or deserve to
be provided, the same levels of protection. Specifically, while both
race and gender discrimination interests have earned a high degree of
stature amongst the hierarchy of discrimination categories, marital
status has not. In fact, it does not appear that either federal or state
legislatures or courts will elevate marital status to the highest level of
protection. Marital status discrimination does not have the negative
history that race and gender discrimination have, and marital status
discrimination does not seem as offensive to many. Thus, I have pre-
ferred to separate and distinguish amongst the categories, rather than
to discuss housing discrimination as a whole.
399. An interesting free exercise/discrimination case involving a religious university
has arisen in the District of Utah. The American Civil Liberties Union, acting on behalf of
named testers, filed suit alleging gender discrimination against apartment owners who had
contracted with Brigham Young University (BYU) to provide housing to BYU students.
Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Utah 1995).
Students of BYU must live in university-approved housing or live on campus, but
there is not enough dormitory space on campus for all of the University's students. Apart-
ment owners enter into a contract with the University which enumerates requirements the
owners must meet to qualify for BYU approval: among them is a requirement that single
student housing must be segregated according to gender. As a result, some apartment
owners offer housing to only one gender. Testers attempted to acquire housing at several
complexes which housed only students of the opposite sex.
Unlike cases discussed in this Note above, the ACLU's suit involves the free exercise
rights of a religious institution, rather than just the rights of an individual landlord. Brig-
ham Young University's motive in contracting with the apartment owners is to provide
places to live in accordance with its sponsoring religion's tenets. The apartment owners'
motive, of course, is profit. Without the University's approval, students, comprising a sub-
stantial percentage of the tenant market, are not permitted to live in their complexes.
On the one hand are gender discrimination prohibitions which are granted a high level
of protection in the hierarchy of discrimination categories. On the other hand are the free
exercise rights of a religious university to provide off-campus housing conforming with its
standards and of the students to live in places where their religious lifestyle will not be
infringed upon.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the apartment owners and
BYU, as intervenor. The court found that the testers were denied housing not because of
gender discrimination, but because they were non-students. The complexes' policy of only
renting to students does not violate the FHA and the testers' status as non-students proved
that they were not "otherwise qualified," aside from being the wrong gender, to rent at the
complexes in question. Joan O'Brien, Landlords Can Rent Only to BYU Students, THE
SALT LAxE TRmBUN, Feb. 2, 1995, at B1.
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Furthermore, for the majority of this Note, race and gender dis-
crimination have been removed from the equation not because they
are inapplicable to the housing discrimination/free exercise conflict,
but because the outcome of balancing those categories of discrimina-
tion against free exercise is certain: absent a specific statutory exemp-
tion, the discrimination interests prevail. The difficulty of balancing
arises only when a "lesser" category of discrimination-specifically,
marital status400-is implicated.401
The various outcomes of state supreme courts on this balancing
issue demonstrate the extremity of the choice that has been made.
Though Massachusetts remanded to the trial court for final determina-
tion and Minnesota's resolution did not turn on the exemption analy-
sis, both states strongly indicated a preference for the free exercise
interest while Alaska and California opted for the marital status pro-
tection interest. But neither outcome is entirely sensible when con-
fronted with various hypotheticals. It does not seem reasonable to
allow a "Donald Trump"-type of landlord to discriminate in renting
his 100-unit apartment building, after a state renders a decision in
favor of free exercise. On the other hand, the widower desiring to
rent one bedroom in his home seems unduly burdened by the anti-
discrimination laws that forbid him from favoring a married, versus an
unmarried couple.402 The difference between the two scenarios, and
therefore the logical place to begin to formulate a proposal, is the sta-
tus of the landlord. The end result of the following proposal is that
small landlords would be granted reasonable allowances for their free
exercise rights, whereas large landlords would have no right to dis-
criminate on the basis of marital status, their free exercise arguments
notwithstanding.
To remedy unreasonable results from a holding that the discrimi-
nation interest prevails under all circumstances, a statutory exemption
for small landlords could be created. For example, a homeowner rent-
ing one or more rooms in his home could be afforded the right to free
400. So far, sexual orientation is not a protected category in any of the four states
discussed in this Note. There is no claim to bring after being discriminated against on such
a basis without the category being listed in the statute. Other allegations such as gender or
marital status discrimination can be made in lieu of sexual orientation discrimination, but it
is unclear how the courts will treat such claims. No such case has arisen. Were it ever to be
added to housing discrimination statutes, it is unclear whether it would receive the same
high level of protection as the race and gender classifications.
401. Indeed, cases of marital status discrimination and sexual orientation discrimina-
tion will arise in greater frequency in the future. Religious sects with tremendous follow-
ings, such as the Roman Catholic Church, do not condone homosexuality or living together
outside marriage. Thus, the bulk of such conflicts cases are likely to arise in either of these
contexts.
402. The above hypotheticals, and any other possible scenarios, presume that race and
gender discrimination are not tolerated.
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exercise through a simple exemption in the state's housing discrimina-
tion statute. California's Fair Employment and Housing.Act 403 will
serve as an example. It easily could be amended to provide that, with
respect to marital status only, unlawful acts would not include failing
to rent room(s) in an owner-occupied single family residence or
unit(s) in a private dwelling containing no more than four units, so
long as the owner/landlord occupied one of those units. Such an ex-
emption does not go much further than the present statute40 and its
predecessor.405 Current California Government Code section
12927(c) states: "'[D]iscrimination' does not include refusal to rent or
lease a portion of an owner-occupied single-family house to a person
as a roomer or boarder living within the household, provided that no
more than one roomer or boarder is to live within the household. '406
The statute already provides a minimal exemption for an owner-occu-
pied home, but fails to go far enough. Obviously, an exemption from
the marital status prohibition would require that two renters (per
room) be accommodated. Thus, the current provision for only one
renter does not solve the above homeowner's problem; a slight nu-
merical modification is needed.40 7
California's Rumford Fair Housing Act,408 the predecessor of the
Fair Employment and Housing Act, serves as a model for drafting a
reasonable exemption for small, privately-owned, owner-occupied
dwellings. This act prohibited only discrimination "in the sale or
rental of public assisted housing accommodations and in any private
dwelling containing more than four units. '409 Such a provision does
not seem unreasonable with respect to protecting free exercise inter-
ests in the face of marital status protections, so long as the owner of
the dwelling occupies one of the four or less units.
Such accommodations for free exercise can rather easily be made
but should be confined to situations involving small landlords in the
limited circumstances outlined above. The statutory exemption fo-
cuses on landlords who, rather than controlling large numbers of units
of housing from afar, rent minimal rooms or units. The small land-
lord's free exercise argument is strong in these cases for the following
reasons: the landlord seeking an exemption is living within close
403. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992).
404. Id.
405. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETy CODE §§ 35700-35744 (West 1973) (repealed 1980). This
act did not protect on the basis of marital status. See id. § 35720.
406. § 12927(c) (emphasis added).
407. Interestingly, this exception appears to allow for limited race and gender discrimi-
nation. This Note's proposal, however, does not permit discrimination on those bases.
408. See supra note 374.
409. Hill v. Miller, 415 P.2d 33, 34 (Cal. 1966) (quoting Cal. Health & Safety Code
§§ 35710, 35720).
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proximity to the activity he finds religiously objectionable, and the ex-
tent to which his activity is "commercial" is limited. Further, only
marital status discrimination-a "lesser" category of discrimination-
is minimally compromised. Thus, state supreme court decisions opt-
ing on the side of the discrimination interest are easily remedied to
allow for limited exercises of religious freedom.
On the other hand, to the extent courts' decisions hold that free
exercise interests trump discrimination protections in all circum-
stances, they could often be impractically applied. It is unreasonable
to allow the owner of a large housing enterprise to freely discriminate
because of his religious convictions. Furthermore, courts are the ap-
propriate vehicle to carve out exceptions to a free exercise rule just as
legislatures are there to create exemptions to an anti-discrimination
rule. Such a court could hold that landlords of dwellings consisting of
greater than four units, or landlords renting rooms in homes that they
do not occupy themselves, must abide by the housing discrimination
statutes notwithstanding free exercise rights. This proposal utilizes
the same language to provide a similar exemption as was suggested in
the case of states with pro-discrimination interest decisions. The court
would use the commerce argument discussed above to find that the
burden requirement is not met or that the landlord's free exercise
rights are limited when acting in a commercial setting. The reasoning
would be that such landlords are operating a larger scale commercial
enterprise, rather than a small business in which they would live and
work in close proximity to those whom they desire to refuse tenancy.
Therefore, larger rental businesses do not have a strong substantial
burden argument because the personal nature of free exercise rights is
overcome by the larger scale of the commercial operation within
which the discriminatory action occurs. The free exercise burden im-
posed by the discrimination statutes in these cases does not appear
very great.
The above recommendation for states who would otherwise opt
to emphasize free exercise rights over the discrimination interest obvi-
ously serves to suggest options for states who have yet to determine
their policies in this particular situation. States that have selected the
free exercise interest have done so unconditionally, without carving
out exceptions for large landlords whose operations are predomi-
nantly commercial or whose units are not located near to where they
live. Those states would likely declare the recommendation unconsti-
tutional because it curtails their First Amendment rights and would
argue that restricting access to the free exercise argument unfairly dis-
advantages large landlords. However, the California Supreme Court
has effectively held that where landlords have voluntarily entered into
a particular business subject to regulation, they are obliged to follow
that regulation. The landlord, of his free will, chose to undertake the
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particular commercial activity and cannot exempt himself from appli-
cable laws. Likewise, the landlord economically disadvantages him-
self by refusing to rent to those who are otherwise qualified tenants.
The above proposals have the practical result of differentiating
between landlords on the basis of the size of their commercial opera-
tion and the proximity of the landlords to the religiously displeasing
activity. The suggestion also has the legal consequence of minimizing
the necessity of choosing one interest over the other; the practical re-
sult is the same under either a pro-free exercise or a pro-discrimina-
tion statute holding. Rather than having groups of states on either
side of the equation, all states could have the same reasonable rules to
apply in this free exercise/discrimination conflict. The only questions
for courts to address would be factual-to determine the size of the
landlord's operation and whether the landlord is living in the dwelling
himself-and then the court would apply the corresponding rule.410
Conclusion
The disparity in outcomes among the four state decisions to grap-
ple with the conflicts issue indicates the difficulty of the balancing task
the courts undertook. It is impossible to say, on balance, one state's
conclusion is "correct," while another is "wrong." This is just one of
the many conflicts that courts must face and that make the law inter-
esting to study as it evolves. One state's high court determines that its
state's free exercise clause is more historically entrenched that marital
status protections, or more important, or both. Another state decides
that the discrimination interest deserves more protection. Many situa-
tions are reasonably resolved by either conclusion. The challenge is to
410. The proposal would be applied to the three case studies presented in the introduc-
tion to this Note as follows: Case study one involves marital status discrimination. The
religious landlord refusing to rent to the couple owns several apartment buildings. Assum-
ing either that the landlord does not live in the complex or that the dwelling contains
greater than four units, he should not be granted a free exercise exemption. In this case,
the landlord's free exercise argument would not be strong because his enterprise is un-
doubtedly commercial and he does not live in close proximity to the act considered sinful.
In case study two, sexual orientation discrimination is at issue. As discussed previ-
ously in this Note, sexual orientation is not yet a protected category under the FHA or any
of the state housing discrimination statutes discussed. If a sex discrimination claim can be
sustained, the couple would prevail. But to the extent that they would make a marital
status discrimination argument, under this proposal, they would lose because the unit de-
sired to be rented is annexed to a private home, presumably occupied by the religious
landlord. An exemption would therefore be afforded the landlord.
Finally, case study three is the easiest case. Race discrimination claims will prevail
over free exercise interests because they are founded upon statutes that have been deter-
mined to reflect compelling government interests. Therefore, under both strict scrutiny
and a lesser standard, the tenant discriminated against on the basis of race (or gender) will
win.
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find solutions for those situations for which a state's chosen rule fails
to reach a reasonable result. So far, only four states have addressed
the issue and have failed to identify landlord status as the determinate
criterion. Perhaps in the future, other states will provide more insight
and legislatures will creatively craft resolutions for this emotionally-
charged conflict, that go far enough, but no further than necessary, to
preserve religious freedoms without compromising this country's dedi-
cation to eradicating discrimination.
